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The purpose of this thesis is to conduct a risk assessment and analysis for the
Ml 09 155mm Self Propelled Howitzer (SPH) Fleet Management Pilot Program. The
objective of this program is to reengineer the fleet's logistical support system by
outsourcing those functions which make sense and that can be performed more efficiently
by private industry. This innovative approach places one contractor, or Fleet Manager, in
charge of sustaining the entire fleet. The researcher used the Concept of Operations
(CONOPS) Document for the program as the primary tool to conduct the risk assessment
and analysis. Using the CONOPS Document as a preliminary Work Breakdown
Structure, the researcher developed two surveys to identify and assess the risks associated
with the program. These surveys enabled the researcher to develop a Risk Watchlist that
identifies and prioritizes the most severe cost and performance risks. The researcher
utilized this watchlist to develop Risk Charts to analyze the potential impact of these risk
events. The Risk Charts graphically display both the risk events identified in the program
and where they might occur. Developing similar Risk Watchlists and Risk Charts can







C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 2
1
.
Primary Research Question 2
2. Secondary Research Questions 2
D. SCOPE 2
E. LITERATURE REVIEWS AND METHODS 3
F. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS 3
G. CHAPTER OUTLINE 4
H. BENEFITS OF STUDY 5
II. OUTSOURCING AND FLEET MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW 7
A. PURPOSE 7
B. OUTSOURCING BACKGROUND 7
C. DOD POLICY ON OUTSOURCING 7
1 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces
(CORM) 8
2. Defense Science Board Task Force on Outsourcing and
Privatization (DSB) 9
3. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 10
D. OUTSOURCING IMPEDIMENTS 12
vn
1. Statutory Restrictions and Congressional Involvement 12
2. A-76-Process 13
E. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF OUTSOURCING ... 13
F. Ml 09 FOV FLEET MANAGEMENT PILOT PROGRAM 14
1. Background 15
2. Objective 17




Fleet Logistical Support 19
2. System Technical Support 20
3. Manufacturing/Maintenance (for End Items and Secondary
Spares) 21
H. SUMMARY 21
III. RISK MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW 23
A. PURPOSE 23
B. RISK 23
C. RISK MANAGEMENT 24
D. PMI'S RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS 25
1 Risk Identification 25
2. Risk Quantification 26
3. Risk Response Development 26
4. Risk Response Control 27




2. Risk Assessment 29
3. Risk Analysis 30
4. Risk Handling 31
F. DOD RISK MANAGEMENT POLICIES 31
G. SUMMARY 33
IV. RISK ASSESSMENT 35
A. PURPOSE 35
B. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS DOCUMENT (CONOPS) . 35
C. METHODOLOGY 36
D. SURVEYS : 38
1 Risk Identification Survey 38
2. Risk Assessment Survey 39
E. SURVEY RESULTS AND RISK WATCHLISTS 41
1 Program Management 42
2. Fleet Logistical Support 43
3. System Technical Support 44
4. Maintenance/Manufacturing 45
F. SUMMARY 46




C. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT RISK CHART 48
1. Contract Oversight - 1.1.1 48
2. Budget and Execution - 1 . 1 .4 50
3. General Management - 1 . 1 .2 51
4. Long-Term Planning -1.1.5 51
5. Requirements Determination - 1.1.3 52
D. FLEET LOGISTICAL SUPPORT RISK CHART 52
1
.
Item Management -1.2.1 52
2. Physical Distribution - 1.2.2 54
3. Maintenance Management - 1.2.3 54
4. Customer Support - 1 .2.6 55
5. Material Fielding - 1 .2.5 55
6. Facilities Management - 1 .2.4 55
7. Collect Performance Data - 1.2.6 55
E. SYSTEM TECHNICAL SUPPORT RISK CHART 56
1. Engineering - 1.3.1 56
2. Product Improvement - 1 .3.4 57
3. Configuration/Change Management - 1.3.2 58
4. Customer Support - 1 .3.5 59
5. Test & Evaluation - 1.3.3 59
F. MANUFACTURING/MAINTENANCE RISK CHART 60
1.
Maintenance - 1 .4.2 61
2. Modification & Conversions - 1 .4.3 61
3. Manufacturing - 1 .4. 1 62
4. End Item & Secondary Item Repair - 1 .4.4 62
G. SUMMARY 62
VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 65
A. SUMMARY 65
1 Outsourcing and Fleet Management Overview 66
2. Risk Management Overview 67
3. Risk Assessment 68
4. Risk Analysis 69
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 69
1 External Risks 70
2. Internal Risks 71
3. Areas for Risk Handling Emphasis 73
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 73
APPENDIX A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) DOCUMENT 75
APPENDIX B. THE M109 FLEET MANAGEMENT RISK ASSESSMENT
SURVEY 79
APPENDIX C. M109 FLEET MANAGEMENT RISK EVENT WATCHLISTS .... 93
LIST OF REFERENCES 99




Figure 2.1. DoD Outsourcing Methodology [Ref. 1 :p. 3] 8
Figure 2.2. Problem: 109 Fleet [Ref. 18:p. 6] 16
Figure 2.3. M109 Fleet Management Concept [Ref. 18:p. 7] 17
Figure 3.1. DSMC Risk Management Process [Ref. 7:p. 5-2] 28
Figure 3.2. Risk Rating Scheme [Ref. 7:p. 3-2] 30
Figure 4.1. Summary CONOPS Document 37
Figure 4.2a. The Risk Assessment Survey Scale [Ref. 4] 40
Figure 4.2b. The Risk Assessment Survey Scale 40
Figure 4.3. Program Management Risk Watchlist 42
Figure 4.4. Fleet Logistical Support Risk Watchlist 43
Figure 4.5. System Technical Support Risk Watchlist 44
Figure 4.6. Maintenance/Manufacturing Risk Watchlist 45
Figure 5.1 . Program Management Risk Chart 49
Figure 5.2. Fleet Logistical Support Risk Chart 53
Figure 5.3. System Technical Support Risk Chart . . 57





Both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have
emphasized that funding levels for modernization must increase if the Department of
Defense (DoD) is to procure the new weapons it will need in the 21st century. [Ref. 10:p.
1] Budget constraints and the end of the Cold War have resulted in a steady decline in
DoD's equipment modernization program. Today, procurement dollars account for a
smaller percentage of the total DoD budget than in recent years. Unfortunately, future
defense budgets are not projected to increase significantly over the next several years.
Although the DoD budget has declined significantly over the last several years,
DoD still maintains a vast in-house support infrastructure which consumes a large and
growing share of the DoD budget. Thus, the challenge for DoD is to shift resources from
support to procurement. Many people believe that DoD can accomplish this task by
outsourcing many of these support functions. The Defense Science Board and the
Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces support an aggressive DoD
outsourcing policy. Both committees believe that DoD can save billions of dollars
annually by contracting out nearly all support functions to private industry. Such massive
gains are not without risks. As a result, it is incumbent upon the military leadership to
conduct a thorough risk assessment of all outsourcing initiatives.
The Ml 09 Self Propelled Howitzer (SPH) Fleet Management Pilot Program is one
of DoD's most ambitious efforts to capitalize on the potential benefits of outsourcing.
The objective of the program is to significantly reduce life cycle support costs while
improving operational readiness and performance of the fleet by implementing business
process efficiencies. The Ml 09 Fleet Management Pilot Program is an effort by the
Army to improve the management of the Ml 09 Fleet by outsourcing logistical sustain-
ment functions for the entire fleet to a Fleet Manager. The Pilot Program will use the
Fleet Manager to manage the total scope of operations supporting the production and
sustainment of all Ml 09 Family of Vehicles (FOV) units and other customers world-
wide. The scope of items to be included in the Pilot Program includes the M109A2-A6
howitzer and the M992A0-A2 Field Artillery Ammunition Support Vehicle (FAASV).
As with all new programs, it is imperative to develop a formal risk management
plan for the Pilot Program. This plan needs to identify, assess, analyze, control, and
handle all the risks associated with the program. Failure to do so will undoubtedly under-
mine the projected benefits of the program.
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B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to conduct a risk assessment and analysis for the
Ml 09 SPH Fleet Management Pilot Program. This thesis will identify, assess, and
analyze the risks associated with outsourcing the specific functions outlined under the
Pilot Program.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
What are the most significant risks associated with implementing the Ml 09 Fleet
Management Pilot Program and how may these risks affect the program?
2. Secondary Research Questions
1
.
What is the current DoD policy regarding outsourcing and what are the
advantages and disadvantages associated with outsourcing Government
functions?
2. What is the Ml 09 Fleet Management Pilot Program and what are the
functions to be outsourced under this Pilot Program?
3. What is risk management and what are the current Department of
Defense (DoD) policies and regulations guiding risk management?
4. What are the high risk events in each of the major areas of the program
and how can these risks affect the program in terms of cost and perform-
ance?
5. Which areas in the program exhibit the highest degree of risk?
D. SCOPE
Almost every new program in DoD exhibits risks that can affect cost, schedule,
and/or performance. This thesis will focus on identifying the specific risks associated
with each of the potential functions to be outsourced under the Fleet Management
Program. For this thesis, the researcher will consider the cost and performance risks
associated with implementing the Pilot Program. Once the individual risk events are
identified, the research will focus on prioritizing and assessing the risks by creating a
Risk Event Watchlist. From the Watchlist, the researcher will identify the high risk areas
in the program. Although risk mitigating methods and procedures will be discussed, this
thesis will only assess and analyze the risks involved in the Pilot Program. The
researcher will not propose or analyze appropriate risk mitigation techniques for the
program.
E. LITERATURE REVIEWS AND METHODS
The first objective of this research paper will be to provide an overview of the
Ml 09 Fleet Management Pilot Program. This will be accomplished primarily through a
literature review of reports from the Ml 09 Program Office. These reports include
Business Case Studies, Cost/Benefit Analyses, Workshop Meetings, After Action
Reports, and other miscellaneous reports involving implementation of Fleet Management.
In addition, the researcher will explain how the Pilot Program supports current DoD
outsourcing initiatives. This will be accomplished through a review of sources including
periodicals, books, reports, and DoD Documents.
The next objective will be to provide an overview of risk management and DoD's
policies and regulations concerning risk management. This will be accomplished through
a literature review of both private sector and DoD risk management methods and proce-
dures. In addition, the researcher will review current DoD policy outlined in the new
DoD 5000 series documents.
The third objective of this thesis will be to identify potential risk events under
each element of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Document. The researcher uses
the CONOPS Document as the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) for the program. The
researcher will conduct interviews and surveys with technical experts in order to identify
risk events involved in the Pilot Program. Functional area experts will identify risk
events under each CONOPS element down to the third level.
The final objective of this thesis will be to quantify and analyze the identified
risks. The researcher will accomplish this by conducting a survey with personnel
involved in the program. This survey will ask personnel to quantify the probability of
occurrence and severity of impact of each risk event identified. A Risk Event Watchlist
will be developed to prioritize the most severe risks associated with the program. The
researcher will apply this Watchlist back to the CONOPS Document in order to identify
the high risk areas in the program.
F. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS
Definition and acronyms common to DoD and the Army are noted throughout this
document.
G. CHAPTER OUTLINE
This thesis assesses and analyzes the risks associated with the Ml 09 FOV Fleet
Management Pilot Program.
Chapter I. Introduction
The introduction will identify the focus and purpose of this thesis and will state
the researcher's primary and subsidiary research question.
Chapter II. Outsourcing and Fleet Management Overview
This chapter will provide an overview of the Pilot Program and will identify and
explain the specific functions to be outsourced in the program. In addition, the
researcher will provide an overview of the current DoD outsourcing initiatives and
outline both the potential advantages and disadvantages associated with outsourcing
Government functions to private industry.
Chapter III. Risk Management Process
This chapter will discuss risk management concepts and methodologies utilized
by both civilian and military organizations. The researcher will outline the risk
management methods taught by both the Program Management Institute (PMI) and the
Defense Systems Management College (DSMC). The researcher will conclude this
chapter by explaining risk management policies and guidance outlined in the new DoD
5000 series documents.
Chapter IV. Risk Assessment
This chapter will identify the risks obtained from the surveys and interviews. The
researcher will utilize a second round of surveys to quantify and prioritize the risk events.
Each risk event will be categorized by the probability of occurrence and the severity of
impact. The results from the surveys will be graphed on a risk rating diagram. From the
diagram, a Risk Event Watchlist will be developed of the top-ten risk events in each of
the program's major areas.
Chapter V. Risk Analysis
This chapter will apply the Risk Watchlist developed in Chapter IV back to the
CONOPS Document. The researcher will develop a risk chart of the CONOPS
Document and will categorize each CONOPS element according to the degree of risk
each element exhibits. The researcher will analyze the high risk events in each CONOPS
element and discuss their potential impact on meeting cost and performance objectives.
Chapter VI. Summary and Recommendations
This chapter will summarize the findings of the research by answering the
research questions and will present recommendations for further research and study.
H. BENEFITS OF STUDY
This study will provide a Risk Event Watchlist and a Risk Chart for each major
area for the Ml 09 Fleet Management Program. The Watchlist is a potentially valuable
tool for the Program Manager (PM) since it is a convenient way for the PM to track and
prioritize different risk events associated with the Program. The Risk Chart will help the
PM identify high risk areas in the program. Both products, the Risk Watchlist and the
Risk Chart, will assist the PM in developing risk mitigating strategies. This research
could also assist the PM in developing the Statement of Work (SOW) and in alerting
contracting officers to potential high risk areas in monitoring the contract. Finally, as an
Artillery Officer, the researcher will benefit from this research by gaining knowledge and
experience working with a Field Artillery Program Office.

II. OUTSOURCING AND FLEET MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW
A. PURPOSE
This chapter first provides an introduction to outsourcing and explains Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) policy on outsourcing. This introduction brings together
information from a number of high-level reports explaining the direction DoD is taking
regarding outsourcing. The chapter then presents an overview on the Ml 09 Fleet
Management (FM) Program and how this program supports current DoD outsourcing
initiatives. The researcher will first explain the background and objectives for the
program. Then, the researcher will identify and explain the structure of the program and
the functions to be outsourced under the program.
B. OUTSOURCING BACKGROUND
Outsourcing, which occurs in both the public and private sectors, refers to the
transfer of a support function performed by an in-house organization to an outside service
provider. While the Government or the outsourcing firm continues to provide the
appropriate oversight, the vendor is typically granted extensive flexibility regarding how
the work is performed. In successful outsourcing arrangement, the vendor has limited
restrictions placed upon it. As a result, the vendor is able to utilize new technologies and
business practices to improve service and/or reduce cost. Usually, the vendor is selected
as the result of a competition among qualified bidders. [Ref. 5 :p. 6]
Outsourcing is expanding rapidly in the private sector as more companies turn to
outside sources to free management's time and energy to focus on the company's core
competencies. While cost savings are a major factor in the growth of outsourcing, access
to better technology and better qualified people are the primary reason. Public sector
agencies at Federal, state, and local levels have also demonstrated the value of
outsourcing in terms of saving money (30% plus savings) and providing better, more
responsive service. [Ref. 5:p. 6A] Today, DoD is closely examining its outsourcing
policy and initiatives to offset budget constraints and believes that an aggressive
outsourcing initiative, if properly implemented, will improve services at significantly
reduced costs.
C. DOD POLICY ON OUTSOURCING
Traditionally, DoD's approach to outsourcing follows a two-step process. First,
DoD distinguishes "core" from "non-core" activities. Core activities, by definition,
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cannot be outsourced and include all those activities that are directly involved in
warfighting and/or activities for which no adequate private sector capability exists or can
be expected to be established. DoD then divides non-core activities into those that DoD
will produce internally and those that it will procure from an external source. The figure







Figure 2.1. DoD Outsourcing Methodology [Ref. l:p. 3]
In the past, DoD broadly defined core activities that included many support functions. As
a result, an infrastructure has ballooned in DoD which costs billions of dollars annually to
maintain. Today, DoD is attempting to redefine the concept of core activities by
narrowing its scope to include only those activities that are "inherently Governmental"...
activities that, for legal or constitutional reasons, it would be inappropriate to relinquish
responsibility to an outside source. DoD's evolving policy supporting outsourcing is
evident in several high level reports. Below is a description of these reports and their
findings.
1. Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM)
The report from the CORM, which was published in 1995, was one of the first
major documents to promote an aggressive DoD outsourcing initiative. The Commission
realized that DoD could increase efficiency and save money by adopting more innovative
business practices used in the private sector. These activities can drive down support
costs and free money for needed readiness and modernization programs. The Commis-
sion believed that the Government in general, and DoD in particular, needed to
reestablish the long-standing national policy of relying primarily on the private sector for
services that need not be performed by the Government. Relying more on the private
sector enhances competition which, for DoD commercial activities, typically lowers costs
by 20 percent. These activities include social services, health services, Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) support, base maintenance,
education/training, installa-tion services, data processing, product manufacturing,
equipment maintenance, and real property maintenance. By outsourcing these types of
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activities, DoD would save $3 billion per year that could be reprogrammed for higher
priority defense needs such as equipment modernization.
The Commission is confident its recommendations will increase competition,
lower support costs, and improve performance. The following recommendations support
outsourcing of sustainment activities for new and existing weapon systems:
• Outsource all commercial type support activities.
• Outsource new support requirements.
• Withdraw OMB Circular A-76; amend or repeal legislative restrictions.
• Move to a depot maintenance system relying on the private sector.
• Direct support of all new systems to competitive private contractors.
• Outsource selected material management activities.
Although there are enormous opportunities to outsource DoD commercial
activities, not every activity should be performed in the private sector. The conditions for
successful outsourcing are not always present, and the Government must retain certain
core functions to protect public interest. Notwithstanding, the commission concludes its
remarks by stating that outsourcing candidates include activities that range from routine
commercial support activities, such as janitorial services, to highly-specialized support of
military weapons. [Ref. 2:Chapter. 3]
2. Defense Science Board Task Force on Outsourcing and Privatization
(DSB)
The DSB Task Force Report was charged to develop recommendations
concerning ways DoD could use outsourcing as a tool to reduce support costs while
simultaneously enhancing support effectiveness. Like the CORM, the Task Force was
convinced that an aggressive outsourcing initiative would save DoD billions of dollars
annually on support costs. In order to realize these savings, the Task Force recommended
the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) set a target for the year 2002 of $10 billion in
outsourcing-related savings to fund investment programs. According to the Task Force,
"a revolution in DoD business affairs is needed to pay for the revolution in DoD military
affairs." [Ref. 5:p. 7A] This revolution will require DoD to:
•Change defense policies and procedures to facilitate outsourcing.
Relieve legislative impediments and regulatory constraints.
Improve defense contracting procedures and incentives to encourage greater
reliance on outsourcing.
The Task Force's policy goal is to shift $7 — $12 billion per year from support to
modernization by the year 2002. The Task Force cites the decline in procurement
funding while support funding continues to consume a progressively larger portion of the
DoD budget. Below is a list that summarizes the key elements of an aggressive
outsourcing strategy proposed by the Task Force:
• Establish a presumption for outsourcing.
• Reduce reliance for A-76.
• When A-76 is necessary, expedite the process and "level the playing field."
• Outsource broad support functions.
• Eliminate statutory and institutional impediments.
• Establish implementation plan with aggressive targets and milestones - hold
senior managers accountable.
The Task Force stated that strong top-down leadership is critical to revolutionize DoD
business practices. Presently, there are dozens of statutory requirements as well as mid-
level resistance which impede progress. As a result, the Task Force recommends that the
SECDEF reiterate in a formal policy statement that the private sector is the preferred
provider ofDoD support services. The Secretary should stress that all non-combat
support services be considered for outsourcing except those functions that are inherently
Governmental. DoD leadership must persuade the institution that it is committed to
implementing an aggressive outsourcing program and that outsourcing is critical to the
long term combat effectiveness of U.S. military forces. [Ref. 5:pp. 1-67]
3. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
The QDR outlines the SECDEF's vision for the U.S. military as we move towards
the 21st century. Secretary Cohen emphasizes that our military forces and operations are
changing in response to new threats and advances in technology. As a result, the way we
support the warfighter must also change. Under today's fiscal constraints, DoD must be
more efficient and cost-effective in order to serve the warfighter faster, better, and
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cheaper. The forces envisioned will require a different support structure. Achieving
these forces will also require us to increase our investments in new weapon systems. To
afford these critical investments, DoD will need to realize offsetting efficiencies in
support operations.
Secretary Cohen strongly believes DoD must reduce the defense infrastructure in
order to support our investment accounts. The Secretary states that infrastructure reduc-
tions have lagged force structure reductions. For example, from 1989 to 1997, DoD
reduced total active duty military end strength by 32%. During the same period, DoD has
only reduced domestic infrastructure by 21%. In addition, 61% of people employed by
DoD in FY 1997 are performing infrastructure functions. Although Secretary Cohen
believes our force structure is headed towards the 2 1 st century, our infrastructure is still
stuck in the past. As a result, Secretary Cohen promotes outsourcing as the critical
component to reengineering DoD business practices.
The QDR devotes an entire section to reengineering the defense infrastructure:
Section VIII - Achieving a 21st Century Defense Infrastructure. This section specifically
outlines the actions DoD must take to reduce support costs. Below are the outsourcing
initiatives recommended by the QDR to reduce the defense-wide infrastructure and the
military department infrastructure:
Outsource selected Defense Logistics Agency functions.
Reengineer Defense Financial Accounting Service operations by
consolidating and outsourcing accounting functions.
Outsource selected patient care, medical training, and installation support
in the Defense Health program.
Combine operational commands and outsource monitoring activities.
Compete, outsource, or privatize military department infrastructure
functions that are closely related to commercial functions. Most of these
actions involve logistics and installation support functions.
Secretary Cohen has established a Defense Reform Task Force to examine the
best opportunities to outsource and privatize non-core activities. The results of this task
force will be published later this year. [Ref. 10: Section VIII]
It is clear through the above reports that DoD is actively pursuing an aggressive
outsourcing policy. DoD realizes that it can not afford to rely on a costly and outdated
infrastructure. In addition, projected budget constraints will prevent DoD from funding
investment accounts to the appropriate level unless dramatic changes are made. As a
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result, DoD leadership plans to reengineer its support structure by adopting more
commercial business practices. Many of these plans will promote outsourcing by
narrowing the scope of activities that are considered inherently Governmental. DoD is
starting to revert back to the principle that the Government should not perform private
sector type functions unless a compelling need is demonstrated.
D. OUTSOURCING IMPEDIMENTS
DoD has been very successful in accomplishing its primary mission: to prepare
for and fight military conflicts. As a result, it has been very hard to change the support
infrastructure of DoD. Deputy Secretary of Defense, John White, stated, "the hardest
thing to change are institutions that have been successful and need to change anyway."
[Ref. 5:p. 37] However, due to fiscal constraints, DoD must change the way it supports
the force. Unfortunately, there are many impediments to an aggressive DoD outsourcing
strategy. The largest obstacles within DoD to outsourcing Government functions are
statutory restrictions, congressional involvement, and the complexity and lack of equity
in the A-76 public/private competition.
1. Statutory Restrictions and Congressional Involvement
Listed below are the key legislative provisions that restrict DoD's ability to




10 USC 2461 — Mandates extensive reporting to Congress, including cost
comparison study, prior to outsourcing any function performed by more than
45 DoD employees.
1 USC 2464 ~ Requires SECDEF to identify core logistical functions that
cannot be outsourced. Changing classification requires congressional
approval.
10 USC 2466 -- States that no more than 40% of the funds available for depot
level maintenance may be outsourced to private contractors.
1 USC 2469 — Requires the SECDEF conduct a public/private competition
before outsourcing any depot level maintenance workload with a value greater
than $3 million.
Section 8020 of the FY96 Appropriations Act — Prohibits DoD from
expending any funds to outsource DoD functions performed by more than 1
DoD civilian employees until a most efficient cost analysis has been
completed and the results certified to congress.
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The statutes listed above increase congressional involvement in outsourcing decisions.
As a result, the present process complicates, delays, and discourages DoD efforts to
implement an aggressive outsourcing strategy.
2. A-76 Process
OMB Circular A-76 describes the procedures that Federal agencies must follow in
order to outsource functions performed by Government employees. This process
mandates a public/private cost comparison between the private sector and the
Government proposed "Most Efficient Organization" (MEO), when 1 or more civilian
jobs are displaced. Outsourcing proceeds only when the private sector cost advantage
over the MEO exceeds 10%.
The A-76 process is complex and time-consuming. The process, which requires
extensive documentation and reporting, can delay implementation of outsourcing
decisions by up to 48 months. As a result, most DoD managers are discouraged and place
their priority on initiatives that can be implemented in a shorter time frame. Also, A-76
competitions are inequitable and generally favor the Government entity. DoD organiza-
tions usually lack the accounting systems needed to ensure accurate allocation of indirect
costs. As a result, Government proposals may not include all relevant costs needed for a
fair competition. Finally, A-76 competitions usually focus on cost and often do not
consider other important factors such as quality of service and responsiveness. As is the
case with the congressional statutes, the A-76 process stifles initiative and prevents DoD
from implementing best business practices. [Ref. 5:p. 41 A]
E. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF OUTSOURCING
Today, DoD relies on the private sector to provide many support functions.
Proponents of outsourcing often cite the benefits of contracting out non-core functions to
private industry. First, by contracting out a service provided by the Government, the
Government is relieved of the day-to-day operations and support of that service.
Although the Government will be required to provide oversight on the contract, the
Government's work load would be greatly reduced. This will enable the Government to
focus on more critical functions.
Second, contracting out services normally performed by the Government will
promote competition and stimulate economic growth in a community. Enhanced
competition normally leads to greater efficiencies and improved services.
Finally, outsourcing proponents believe economic efficiencies always follow from
increased competition. Today, it is assumed that private industry operates more
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efficiently than the Government. Private industry is less constrained by legal and statu-
tory requirements or by socio-economic goals. Contractors consider life-cycle costs and
are motivated by profit. A contractor has the incentive to operate efficiently to maximize
its profit. The Government does not have this same profit incentive to motivate
efficiency. [Ref. 26:pp. 1 1-12]
Not all services provided by the Government can or should be outsourced. There
are many disadvantages to outsourcing that must be considered. First, potential effici-
ency gains from outsourcing benefit the Government only if the Government is able to
write an effective contract. Unfortunately, it is hard to craft a contract that is beneficial to
both the Government and industry for a complex outsourcing arrangement. Also, the
Government lacks experience in developing and negotiating this type of contract. On the
other hand, a private firm, which is motivated by profit, is likely to have more experience
in entering this type of contract.
Second, many key decision-makers associate contracting out defense services
with fraud and abuse. Although the most serious problems stem from only a few bad
contractors, Government officials still fear that contractors, when given the opportunity,
will take advantage of the Government by passing major costs on to the Government.
Third, there is a lack of competition in many markets. Competition stimulates
markets and forces private firms to operate efficiently and to market the best available
buys to the consumer. When competition is weak or non-existent, the supplier gains a
tremendous advantage by setting the price. In this situation, the Government usually has
no choice but to pay the asking price. [Ref. 26:pp. 16-19]
Finally, many field commanders want more real-time control of their assets
during contingencies. By contracting out logistical functions, DoD abdicates this critical
mission and responsibility and is forced to rely on a contractor for sustainment
operations.
F. M109 FOV FLEET MANAGEMENT PILOT PROGRAM
The M 1 09 Fleet Management Program goal is to create significant savings in life-
cycle support and procurement costs that can be redirected to modernize the Ml 09 FOV.
To accomplish this goal, dramatic changes to the Army's logistical system will be needed
to improve engineering and logistical functions of the fleet. The result will enhance
weapon system performance as well as reduce operational and support costs. The general
approach in achieving this goal is to implement both better commercial business practices
and a fleet management approach by outsourcing functions related to the logistical
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sustainment of the system. Fleet Management is a new Army initiative to examine what
cost savings can be accrued by putting a single entity in charge of maintaining the fleet.
The Pilot Program was developed by PM Paladin/FAASV in response to directives and
guidance from the Army Acquisition Executive, the Commanding General, Army
Material Command, the CORM, and other DoD activities to maximize the use of
contractor provided, total life-cycle logistical support. [Ref. 17:p. 1]
1. Background
The Ml 09 FOV consists of the M109A2/A3, M109A4/A5 and the M109A6
Paladin 155mm Self Propelled Howitzers as well as the M992A0/A1/A2 Field Artillery
Ammunition Support Vehicles (FAASV). The M109A6 Paladin is being produced and
fielded to active duty units to replace the M109A2/A3 models. There are also plans to
field National Guard units to replace their M109A4/A5 models. As of April 1997,
estimates of assets in the Ml 09 FOV are: [Ref. 17:p. 1]
M109A2/A3 = 865 (Reduced as A6 Paladin production continues)
M109A4/A5 = 1017 (National Guard)
M109A6 = 520 (Eventually approximately 914)
M992A0 = 270 (Reduced as A2 production continues)
M992A1 = 124 (Reduced as A2 production continues)
M992A2 = 395 (Eventually approximately 885)
In addition, 5800 vehicles have been sold to foreign countries under the Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) Program.
The life-cycle support for the M 1 09 FOV is provided by multiple Government
and industry organizations using different processes to provide both services and
supplies. Figure 2.2 depicts the current problem with the fleet. First, duplicative
infrastructure and processes are common throughout the fleet: no one entity or
organization is in charge. The Program Management Office (PMO), the US Army Tank
Automotive and Arma-ments Command (TACOM) ~ Armament Research,
Development, and Engineering Center (ARDEC), TACOM — Armaments and Chemical
Acquisition Logistical Activity (ACALA), and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
provide program asset management, technical support, and inventory control point
service. At the wholesale level, procure-ment and overhaul activities are inefficient and





























Inhibitors to Efficient Training/ Operations:
• Symptoms
> Long Time to Order/Pjeceive Parts
> Manuals Not Lp4o-date
> Don't Capture Reliability Data
i Extra Parts Ordered; Dortt Trust System
> Opr Maint Training Out-of-date





No One Organization is in Charge of Ml09 Fleet
Figure 2.2. Problem: M109 Fleet [Ref. 18:p. 6]
contractor acquire and provide common and unique parts for initial provisioning, produc-
tion, modification, repair, overhaul, and war reserves. This redundant and inefficient
infrastructure results in parts obsolescence, surplus inventories, few reliability improve-
ments, and outdated automation systems. The inventory of spare parts is another big cost
driver. These parts, which are maintained by the Government, incur personnel, storage,
and upkeep costs. [Ref. 17:p. 2]
Sustainment activities at the unit level are also inefficient and costly. The
following symptoms inhibit training and adversely affect readiness: excessive time to
order and receive parts, outdated manuals, unreliable technical data, outdated operator
maintenance training, and excessive parts ordered. The current infrastructure limits
opportunity to achieve cost reduction, implement best business practices, improve
weapon system performance, and modernize equipment. [Ref. 17:p. 2]
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2. Objective
The objective of the Ml 09 FOV Fleet Management Pilot Program is to reengineer
the fleet's logistical support system by outsourcing those functions that make sense and
can be performed more efficiently by private industry. This innovative approach places
one contractor, or Fleet Manager, in charge of sustaining the entire fleet. Fleet Manage-
ment does not abdicate the Government's responsibility of supporting the fleet, but
transfers those functions to a private contractor who can manage and perform these
support functions more efficiently.
The main goal of the Pilot Program is to create significant savings in life-cycle
support costs that can be redirected to modernize the fleet. Concurrently, the Fleet
Manager will improve operational readiness and performance by implementing best
business practices and modernization by continuously upgrading spare parts and
components. To realize these savings, the Pilot Program will reengineer business
processes, streamline the supply pipeline, and implement technological improvements.
[Ref. 17:p. 2] Figure 2.3 below describes the fleet management concept.
M109 Fleet Management Concept
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Procurement and overhaul savings are realized by eliminating the redundancies inherent
in the current system by relying on the Fleet Manager for a single integrated process. The
Fleet Manager will also own, control, and distribute spares/reparables by utilizing up-to-
date automated systems. Finally, the Fleet Manager will be required to follow the
Government's priorities in upgrading spare parts and components and in implementing
reliability enhancements and Preplanned Product Improvements (P3I).
At the unit level, sustainment costs will also be significantly reduced. The
following enhancements will improve the operational readiness and performance of the
fleet: parts will be received 2-5 days using commercial agents, inventories will be
reduced, field service training will be provided, and a computer based system for
ordering, training, and maintenance will be established. If properly implemented, the
Fleet Manager will achieve the projected cost savings by reducing the fleet unique
inventory by 50% and by reducing the inventory turnover to $12-15 million annually.
This will result in a 25-30% annual saving totaling $10 million.
G. OVERVIEW OF THE FLEET MANAGEMENT PILOT PROGRAM
The Army wants to have one organization in charge of weapon system life-cycle
support. The Pilot Program will require the Fleet Manager to support the production and
sustainment of the fleet worldwide. To accomplish this support, the Fleet Manager must
be organizationally structured to provide a seamless, single information system between
the Fleet Manager and its customers. The Fleet Manager is expected to establish an
innovative process for the customer (the soldier) to efficiently communicate transactions
over the internet/intranet from home station to the Fleet Manager. At unit and support
maintenance levels, the soldier will be linked electronically to the Fleet Manager, which
will facilitate technical support. The Fleet Manager will own all Ml 09 FOV inventory.
This will facilitate on-time direct delivery of materials to the soldier using commercial
agents and will assist the modernization of components. The Fleet Manager will also be
able to give the soldier access to real time inventory and financial information by
accounting for all transactions on a single network. Financial transactions will be
streamlined by credit/debit cards and electronic financial reporting. The Fleet Manager
will maintain the single data base, accessible to all authorized customers, needed for life-
cycle support act; vities. [Ref. 17:pp. 2-3]
Concep. ly, the Fleet Manager should achieve greater efficiencies by broaden-
ing the scope of its functions. As a result, the Ml 09 Fleet Management Concept includes
many functions that have never been outsourced before. This approach is not without
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risks, and presents the PM with many potential problems. Thus, central to the execution
of the Pilot Program is the Government's Pilot Program Management and Oversight
Group (MOG). This group will provide contract oversight and will oversee the prepara-
tion of the Statement of Work (SOW), Request for Proposal (RFP), performance metrics,
and administration of the contract. The MOG will be the operational interface between
the soldier and the Fleet Manager. In addition, it will coordinate weapon system
configuration actions, review and certify data development, and establish guidance and
priority on P3I and component upgrades. The MOG will also ensure accurate availability
of data to Army and DoD legacy systems, coordinate all functions that must be retained
as "inherently Governmental functions," assess the performance of the Fleet Manager
through use of appropriate metrics, and coordinate the award of incentives associated
with the contract. Other responsibilities include requirements determination, budgeting
for modifications, participation on integrated product teams, quality assurance oversight,
and cost performance tracking. [Ref. 17:p. 5]
The Concept of Operations Document (CONOPS) (Appendix A) outlines all the
functions performed by the Government to sustain the fleet. Thus, it identifies all the
functions that could potentially be outsourced to a private contractor under the Fleet
Management Concept. This document, which was promulgated in February 1 997, was
developed by the Fleet Management Working Group under the direction and guidance of
the Paladin Program Office. Participants of the working group included all Government
agencies presently involved with the life-cycle support activities of the fleet. The Fleet
Manager's functions can be subdivided into three major areas: Fleet Logistical Support,
System Technical Support, and Manufacturing/Maintenance. These areas are
summarized below.
1. Fleet Logistical Support
This area, which includes the functions of major and secondary item management
(Class VII and IX), distribution and customer support, will require the Fleet Manager to
adopt innovative business processes involving procurement, inventory management,
requisitioning, distribution, and status reporting. It will transfer item management
responsibilities for the fleet, within the scope of the Pilot Program, from the US Army
Material Command (AMC) and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to the Fleet
Manager. Fleet Logistical Support consists of the following functions: [Ref. 21 :pp. 2-8]
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• Item Management — computation of requirements providing direction for
procurement, cataloging, repair, priority, distribution, and disposal to
support the customer the fastest way at the lowest cost.
• Physical Distribution ~ receive, store, account for, issue, transport, and
provide visibility of material in support of wholesale and retail spare parts.
• Maintenance Management — acquiring and providing the necessary
expertise and information to maintain the system in the field and to
provide soldiers instruction on how to maintain the equipment.
• Facilities Planning Management ~ physical buildings and structures
needed to properly store and maintain equipment in accordance with
existing laws and regulations.
• Material Fielding ~ providing the system hardware and support packages
to the user while preparing the unit to accept, use, and maintain the
system.
• Customer Support — respond to the customer by providing technical and
administrative support as required.
• Collect Performance Data ~ gather data to assess system technical
performance.
2. System Technical Support
The Fleet Manager is expected to establish a broad base technical capability that
will provide a single point of contact for all technical activity needed for life-cycle
support of the fleet. This integrated capability is needed for implementing best business
practices. System Technical Support consists of the following functions: [Ref. 21 :pp. 8-
12]
• Engineering — hardware and software general engineering functions to
modernize the fleet through the insertion of technology to extend service life,
improve operational capability, and lower support costs.
•
•
Configuration/Change Management ~ establish, maintain, document, and
maintain accountability of all technical descriptions of the product
configuration.
Test & Evaluation — performance validation and verification of new/ modified
parts and systems.
Product Improvement — enhancement or upgrade of systems performance.
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• Customer Support — respond to the customer by providing technical support
as required.
• Life Cycle Software Support ~ develop, document, field, and maintain all
software associated with fleet management.
3. Manufacturing/Maintenance (for End Items and Secondary Spares)
The Fleet Manager is expected to establish and maintain a repair/manufacturing
capability to produce, modify, repair, and overhaul items as required. This will require
the Fleet Manager to operate Class VII storage facilities and provide maintenance support
for retail reparables by establishing and operating regional repair facilities, CONUS and
OCONUS. The Fleet Manager's field service representatives will provide battalion-level
diagnostic assistance. Manufacturing/Maintenance consists of the following functions:
[Ref. 21:pp. 12-13]
• Manufacturing — the capability of turning raw materials into a finished
product, to include end items and secondary items.
• Maintenance — the capability to perform maintenance of fielded items and
facilities and equipment used to manufacture/maintain the item.
• Modification/Conversions — the capability to alter and upgrade existing
assets.
• End Item and Secondary Item Repair/Overhaul ~ the capability to inspect,
disassemble, repair and overhaul end item and secondary items.
H. SUMMARY
Senior DoD leaders agree with the CORM and the DSB recommendations
supporting an aggressive outsourcing policy. The Department believes outsourcing non-
Governmental functions can generate significant cost savings that can be redirected into
the depleted investment accounts. The Pilot Program supports DoD policies and
initiatives regarding outsourcing by establishing a Fleet Manager responsible for the total
life-cycle logistical support for the Ml 09 FOV.
The Ml 09 Fleet Management Pilot Program is a bold and aggressive initiative to
capitalize on the potential benefits of outsourcing. Unfortunately, these benefits do not
come without major risks to the program. Therefore, in order to realize the cost savings
proclaimed by the CORM and the DSB, a formal, systematic risk management process
must be developed and implemented early on by the PM. The following chapter provides
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a broad overview of risk management and describes how PMss can implement an
effective and successful risk management program.
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III. RISK MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW
A. PURPOSE
This chapter provides an introduction to, and an explanation of, risk management
concepts and methodologies. First, the researcher will discuss the risk management
process from the Project Management Institute's (PMI) body of knowledge. This process
provides a business and industry perspective towards risk management. Next, the
researcher will discuss the risk management process contained in current Defense
Systems Management College (DSMC) publications. This process identifies current risk
management principles being taught to the acquisition workforce. Finally, the researcher
will discuss DoD policies outlined in the DoD 5000 series documents. These documents
provide the current guidance on risk management to PMs.
B. RISK
Risk is a measure of the inability to achieve project objectives within defined cost,
schedule, and technical constraints. Risk involves a notion of uncertainty and has two
components: (1) the probability of failing to achieve a particular outcome and (2) the
consequence of failing to achieve that outcome. [Ref. 6:p. 4.5-3] In considering the risks
associated with a program, managers must identify those events and expected
accomplishments, that, if not met, would have an adverse effect on the program. Risk
actually constitutes a lack of knowledge or uncertainty concerning future events. We can
define risk as the cumulative effect that these adverse events could have on a project's
objectives. Future events that are favorable are called opportunities, whereas unfavorable
events are called risks. [Ref. 22 :p. Ill]
Risk can also be defined as a function of uncertainty and damage. As either the
uncertainty or damage increases, the risk increases as well. Another element of risk is the
cause or source of the risk. We can denote this source of danger as a hazard. Certain
hazards can be overcome or minimized by identifying them and taking actions or
safeguards to overcome them. This leads to the conceptual equation that risk is a function
of hazards and safeguards. Risk increases with hazards but decreases with safeguards.
The implication of this equation is that good project management should identify hazards
in order to allow safeguards to be developed to overcome them. If enough safeguards are
available or developed, the risk can be eliminated or reduced to an acceptable level. [Ref.
15:p. 879]
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To better understand risk, it is helpful to break risk into three distinct factors.
These factors are risk events, risk probability, and the amount at stake.
1
.
Risk Events are those outcomes or occurrences that can have a negative
impact on the program. The consequences of these negative events are
described in terms of scope, quality, schedule, and cost.
a. Scope Risks are those associated with changes to project scope
(e.g., adding, deleting, and/or changing elements in the WBS.
b. Quality Risks involve failure to complete tasks to the required
level of technical or quality performance.
c. Schedule Risks involve failure to complete tasks within the
estimated time limits.
d. Cost Risks involve failure to complete tasks within the estimated
budget. It is important to note that risk in one of these four areas
usually entails risk in one or more of the other areas.
2. Risk Probability is the likelihood of occurrence of each of the risk events.
3. Amount at Stake represents the severity or impact of the consequences, if
a particular risk event occurs.
Once these factors are known for a given risk event, the risk event status can be
determined using the following equation: Risk Event Status = Risk Probability x
Amount at Stake. The most serious risks are those involving high probability and high
severity. [Ref. 23:pp. 15-16]
C. RISK MANAGEMENT
By definition, undertaking a project involves risk since a project represents
something new. The importance of risk management is to prepare in advance for possible
adverse events, rather than responding as they occur. Risk management is an organized
means of identifying and measuring risks and developing, selecting, and managing
options for handling these risks. Today, there are several tools available to help the
project office manage risks. The WBS, Statement of Work (SOW), and the Contractor's
Proposal are just a few tools recommended as structures for assessing risks.
According to the Project Management Institute Body of Knowledge (PMBOK),
there are three definitions of risk management: [Ref. 15:p. 880]
1
.
Risk management is a formal process by which risk factors are
systematically identified, assessed, and provided for.
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2. Risk management is a formal systematic method of managing which
concentrates on identifying and controlling areas or events that have the
potential to cause unwanted changes.
3. Risk management is the art and science of identifying, analyzing, and
responding to risk factors throughout the life of the project.
Although different, all three definitions convey the same message. Project Managers
need to develop a systematic approach to identify and sort through uncertainties, select
those uncertainties that are most critical, and select ways to eliminate or reduce these
uncertainties.
Proper risk management implies control and knowledge of future events and is
proactive rather than reactive. It requires a forward thinking process, aimed at identifying
risks and formulating strategies before the risk event has an impact on the program. A
comprehensive risk management program examines all areas of the program at the
appropriate level of detail throughout the life of the program. It requires early and
continuous involvement from all members in the team. The goal of a PM's risk
management plan will reduce not only the likelihood of an event from occurring, but also
the potential magnitude of its impact. [Ref. 15:p. 880]
D. PMI'S RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS
Proper risk management procedures are critical to the overall success of a project.
Therefore, it is essential that a logical and systematic approach is followed. The approach
advocated by PMI is a four-step process: risk identification, risk assessment, risk
response, and risk documentation. PMI's approach is not only concerned with
minimizing the consequences of adverse events, but also includes maximizing the results
of positive events. PMI's four-step process is discussed in more detail below.
1. Risk Identification
During this phase, the PM will try to identify all the potential risks that are likely
to affect the program. Risk identification is a continuous process that should be
performed on a regular basis and includes consideration of internal as well as external
risks. Internal risks are events that the PM can control such as staff assignments.
External risks are those events that the PM has no control or cannot influence such as
Governmental actions. Once the risk event has been identified, program objectives
affected are assessed.
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Various tools and techniques are available for risk identification. They include:
• Checklists - organized by sources of risks and include the project context,
other process outputs, and project/technology issues.
• Flowcharts - developed to help the project team better understand the causes
and effects of risks.
• Interviewing - conducted with various stakeholders to help uncover
opportunities and threats not identified during normal planning activities.
Finally, the sources of the risk event are identified and categorized as to the PM's's
ability to control them. Major sources of risk include changes to requirements, errors,
misunderstandings, poor estimates, and insufficiently-skilled staff. [Ref. 22:pp. 111-114]
2. Risk Quantification
The next step, Risk Quantification, evaluates risk events and risk interactions to
assess the range of possible project outcomes. The goal of this phase is to transform the
risk event into some sort of quantifiable element that can be evaluated in light of the other
risk events in the program. Risk Quantification helps to increase project team
understanding and is primarily concerned with determining which risk events warrant a
response. Thus, its overall objective is to help the PM select from among the numerous
risks in the program, those which require the most attention.
Risk Quantification uses probability analysis. The risks that receive the closest
attention are those which could have the greatest impact on the project and have the most
likely probability of occurrence. Listed below are several tools and techniques that can
help quantify the different risk events in a project: Expected Monetary Value, Statistical
Sum, Simulation, Decision Tree Analysis, and Expert Judge. [Ref. 22:pp. 115-117]
Risk Quantification serves to list opportunities that should be pursued and risks
that require mitigation. It also helps to document which risks the project manager has
decided to either accept or ignore. [Ref. 22:pp. 115-118]
3. Risk Response Development
Now that the project manager has identified and quantified the risks at hand, he or
she can now focus efforts and allocate resources to reduce/eliminate high risk areas. In
other words, the project manager can start to formulate a plan or strategy to address either
the opportunities or risks. Responses to opportunities are called enhancements, while risk
responses to threats involve avoidance, mitigation, or acceptance. Below is a brief
description of these risk response categories.
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• Avoidance - eliminating a threat by eliminating the cause.
• Mitigation - reducing the risk by reducing the probability of occurrence
and/or the severity or consequence.
• Acceptance - accepting the consequences of the risk either by active
acceptance, such as developing a contingency plan, or by passive
acceptance, such as accepting a lower profit.
The product of Risk Response Development is the Risk Management Plan. This
plan should document the procedures that will be used to manage risk throughout the
project. It covers who is responsible for managing the various areas of risks, how the
identification and quantification output will be maintained, how contingency plans will
be implemented, and how reserves will be allocated. [Ref. 22:pp. 119-121]
4. Risk Response Control
The final step in this risk management process involves executing the risk
management plan over the course of the project. As anticipated risks occur or fail to
occur, project personnel will implement their contingency plans. Since change is
inevitable, it is impossible to correctly identify and plan for all risks. Therefore, the basic
cycle of identify, quantify, and respond is repeated throughout the life of the project.
When unplanned risk events occur, it is often necessary to perform work-arounds to
respond to the risk event. Finally, the risk management plan should be continually
updated as the project team responds to planned and unplanned risk events. [Ref. 21 :p.
121]
E. DSMC'S RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS
DSMC's Risk Management Process is limited to program risk management as it
relates to the DoD acquisition process. The focus of their methodology is from a program
office's viewpoint. DSMC's process is only concerned with minimizing the conse-
quences of adverse events, whereas PMI addresses both risk and opportunity. Also,
DSMC's process consists of a different set of phases from PMI's process. DSMC's
process consists of planning, assessment, analysis, and risk handling (see Figure 3.1).
This process is discussed in more detail below.
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Figure 3.1. DSMC Risk Management Process [Ref. 7:p. 5-2]
1. Risk Planning
Risk planning consists of the early activities needed for a successful risk
management plan. Early planning involves the development of an acquisition plan that
facilitates the development of the risk management plan. Early risk plans should: [Ref.
4]
• State the purpose and objective for the plan.
• Identify additional technical expertise needed.
• Assign responsibilities for specific areas.
• Describe the risk assessment process and areas to consider.
• Delineate procedures for risk handling.
• Define a risk rating scheme and describe the risk monitoring metrics.
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• Dictate the risk reporting and documentation needs.
• Establish a report format and schedule.
PMs should start the planning process from pre-solicitation period through program
execution. The PM should structure the risk management plan, develop the acquisition
strategy to support it, generate the RFP, write the source selection plan, evaluate
proposals, and select the contractor, all with program risk as a key consideration. The
purpose of risk management planning is to force organizations to allocate time and effort
towards the subject and to develop a systematic approach to eliminating, minimizing, or
containing the effects of undesirable occurrences.
2. Risk Assessment
Risk identification is the first step in the risk assessment process. Risks cannot be
managed properly until they are identified and described in an understandable way. The
WBS is often recommended for assessing risks, since the WBS encompasses the structure
of everything that will be done or delivered in a program. Assessing each element in the
WBS will, in most programs, ensure overall closure of the risk assessment. Other
approaches include expert interviews, analogy comparisons, and the evaluation of
program plans. [Ref. 7:pp. 4-5]
Preliminary quantification is the second and final step in the assessment process.
This step is intended to provide some prioritization of the risks to facilitate further
evaluation. The risk assessment process tends to handle risk in a probabilistic manner and
the process is simplified when we are able to baseline the risk by defining total failure
and total success. After defining a baseline position, it becomes easier to quantify risk in
each impact area on a meaningful scale. This scale or rating scheme is built against an
agreed set of definitions and provides a framework for eliminating some of the ambiguity
in quantifying the risk. [Ref. 7:pp. 4-8]
As previously described, risk has two components: probability of occurrence and
severity of impact. Using these components, we can develop a simple rating system
based on a defined scale. Once in place, each risk event can be evaluated and quantified
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Figure 3.2. Risk Rating Scheme [Ref. 7:p. 3-2]
3. Risk Analysis
The transition from risk assessment to risk analysis is gradual and often
ambiguous. Many activities normally performed in the analysis phase are actually
conducted in the assessment phase and vice-versa. Risk analysis involves an examination
of the consequences as risk input variables are changed. Its focus is to determine where
and when consequences of risks are likely to occur, the magnitude of exposure, the risk
drivers, and areas of greatest concern. One of the products of the analysis phase is the
watchlist. The watchlist provides a means to track and document activities and actions
performed in the risk analysis process. The PM has the flexibility to configure the
watchlist in any manner it desires, allowing it to assess the risk management effort in a
particular functional area. Usually, the watchlist is portrayed in a hierarchical ranking
with the most severe risks (i.e., those with the highest Risk Event Status) at the top of the
watchlist. The risk event with its corresponding Risk Event Status is listed in this manner
to help prioritize areas that warrant greater attention and resources. [Ref. 7:pp. 4-8]
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4. Risk Handling
Risk Handling is the final phase in the risk management process. It addresses the
specifics on what should be done, when it should be accomplished, who is responsible,
and the impact of the action or inaction. The most appropriate strategy is selected to
obtain an acceptable risk level given program constraints and objectives. Risk Handling
options usually fall into one of the following options: Risk Avoidance, Risk Control, Risk
Assumption, Risk Transfer.
• Risk Avoidance - This involves changing the program's requirements,
specifications, and/or practices to reduce the risks to an acceptable level.
Avoidance eliminates the sources of high risks and replaces them with a lower
risk solution.
• Risk Control - This involves monitoring and managing the risks in a manner
that reduces the likelihood of occurrence and/or the severity of impact. It is a
process of accepting risks and developing strategies to minimize their effect.
• Risk Assumption - This involves acknowledging that the risk exists and
making a conscious decision to accept the risk level without any special effort
to control the risk. This option is most suited for those risk situations that
have been classified as low risk.
• Risk Transfer - This involves the reallocation of risk during the development
and design process. Reallocation can be from one part of the system to
another part or from the Government to the contractor. Risk transfer is a form
of risk-sharing. Common risk transfer techniques used with contractors
include performance incentives, warranties, and type of contract.
After the program's risks have been identified and assessed, the appropriate risk handling
option must be developed. Each handling option is analyzed and those best fitted to
accomplish program objectives are selected. Once the appropriate risk handling option is
selected, the cost, schedule, and performance impacts to the program can be derived.
[Ref. 7:pp.4-ll]
F. DOD RISK MANAGEMENT POLICIES
All PMs are responsible for establishing and executing a risk management
program that satisfies the policies and procedures contained in the DoD 5000 series
documents. The two primary documents that provide guidance to the PM are the DoDD
5000.1 and the DoDD 5000.2-R.
The DoDD 5000.1 emphasizes the need for a formal systematic approach to
control risks in DoD acquisition programs. The DoDD 5000.1 states:
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PMs and other acquisition managers shall continually assess program
risks. Risk must be well understood, and risk manage-ment approaches
developed, before decision authorities can authorize a program to proceed
into the next phase of the acquisi-tion process. To assess and manage
risks, PMs and other acquisition managers shall use a variety of
techniques, including technology demonstrations, prototyping, and test
and evaluation. [Ref. 1 1 :p. 4]
DoDD 5000.1 requires PMs to implement a risk management program. As mentioned
above, program risk management plans must be addressed at each milestone decision
point before approval is granted for the next acquisition phase. Risk aspects addressed at
milestone decision point include: [Ref. 9:Sect 5-B-4]
• Cost, schedule, threat, technology, design and engineering, support,
manufacturing, planned maintenance, and operations.
• Risks inherent in the degree of concurrency proposed.
• Risk contingencies associated with functional area plans (e.g. Requisition
Strategy and Plan, Configuration Plan, Integrated Logistical Plan, Soft-
ware Development Plan, System Engineering Master Plan, Manufacturing
Plan, Test and Evaluation Master Plan, etc.).
The DoDD 5000.2-R follows DoDD 5000.1 with more detailed guidance on
managing risks. This document integrates risk management into the acquisition process,
describes the relationship between risk and various acquisition functions, and establishes
some reporting procedures. Specifically, DoDD 5000.2-R states: [Ref. 12:pp. 3-6]
The PM shall establish a risk management program for each acquisition
program to identify and control performance, cost, and schedule risks.
The risk management program shall identify and track risk drivers, define
risk abatement plans, and provide for continuous risk assessment
throughout each acquisition phase to determine how risks have changed.
The acquisition strategy shall include identification of risk areas of the
program and a discussion of how the PM intends to manage those risks.
Today, DoD recognizes that risk management plays a vital role in the overall
acquisition strategy and requires the PM take an active role in the risk management
process. DoDD 5000.1 and DoDD 5000.2-R require PMs to develop a formal, systematic
approach to identify, analyze, and control risks. This formal approach is forward-looking
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and requires the PM to identify potential problems well before they can occur and
develop strategies that reduce and/or eliminate their negative program impact.
G. SUMMARY
Although the risk management process between the Government and the private
sector contains different terminology and viewpoints, they are essentially the same. Both
processes seek to develop a formal approach to identify, assess, analyze, control, and
document risk events throughout the life of the project.
The DoDD 5000 series requires all PMs to develop a systematic and structured
risk management process. Although these documents primarily address Major Defense
Acquisition Programs (MDAP), risk management must also be performed on all new
DoD programs regardless of scope and complexity.
Fleet Management is an innovative attempt to reengineer the logistical support
structure for a major weapon system. The potential benefits of the program are not
without risk. As a result, it is imperative that the program follow the established risk
management guidelines and procedures presented in this chapter. While there is no best
technique for managing risk, PMs must take these principles and select the most





This chapter discusses the methodology and results of the risk assessment process.
First, the researcher will discuss the CONOPS Document introduced in Chapter II as the
main tool utilized for the risk assessment process. Second, the researcher will explain the
methodology used in conducting the risk assessment for the program as discussed in
Chapter III, Risk Management Overview. Third, the researcher will discuss the different
surveys that were utilized to conduct the risk assessment and the results of these surveys.
Finally, the researcher will develop a watchlist to identify the most significant risks
associated with the program. It is important to note that the evaluation contained herein
is a snapshot assessment of the program. Due to the dynamic nature of the program, the
researcher only included in his assessment data received by 1 October 1997. As a result,
many of the risk events, with their corresponding risk event status, will undoubtedly
change as the program evolves.
B. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS DOCUMENT (CONOPS)
In any new project, it is essential for the Government to articulate its requirements
to the contractor in a clear and concise manner. Since Fleet Management is a new and
untested concept, the PM's task of defining the scope of the requirements was very
challenging. To accomplish this task, the PM formed a Fleet Management Working
Group consisting of various functional experts who were either directly or indirectly
involved in supporting the Ml 09 FOV. Under the PM's direction and guidance, the
working group developed the CONOPS Document in February of 1997. This document
describes all the functions currently provided by the Government to support the fleet.
Thus, it identifies all the functions that could potentially be outsourced to a private
contractor under the Fleet Management Concept. The scope of the Ml 09 Fleet
Management Pilot Program is still evolving and will not be finalized until next year. As
a result, the CONOPS Document is often utilized as a baseline to evaluate the future
concept against current requirements.
The CONOPS Document, which describes the total scope of program activities, is
structurally organized like a WBS. In addition, the CONOPS Document is being utilized
as a baseline to develop the program's actual WBS. Therefore, the CONOPS Document
is an excellent risk management tool to assist in the assessment of the program's risks.
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The Government often utilizes the WBS since ideally the WBS describes everything that
will be done or delivered in a program. In addition, a WBS exhibits the following
attributes that facilitate a thorough and accurate risk assessment: [Ref. 25 :p. 20]
1
.
The WBS identifies in a structured form, all elements of the program in
each phase, and provides a comprehensive framework for assessing each
and every aspect of the program for potential risks.
2. The WBS provides traceability between performance requirements and
risks.
3. The WBS illustrates the systems hierarchy and interfaces for the purpose
of identifying risk dependencies and propagation.
4. The WBS can provide a single point-of-contact for each risk through the
management structure.
Although it is not the program's actual WBS, the CONOPS Document can provide all the
advantages listed above.
The CONOPS Document, shown in Appendix A, decomposes some fleet support
activities down to the sixth level. However, the researcher only utilized the CONOPS
Document down to the third level to conduct the risk assessment process. The researcher
believes that decomposing the CONOPS down to the third level adequately categorizes
the different risk events in sufficient detail. The summary CONOPS Document, utilized
for the risk assessment process, is shown in Figure 4.1.
C. METHODOLOGY
The researcher utilized DSMC's methodology described in Chapter III to assess
both the cost risks and performance risks associated with the program. The first part of
the risk assessment process, identification, was accomplished through the use of surveys
and interviews. First, the researcher, with the Deputy PM's assistance, identified several
functional area experts in each of the four major areas of the CONOPS Document:
Program Management, Logistical Support, System Technical Support, and Manufactur-
ing/Maintenance. Second, four Risk Identification Surveys were developed; one for each
of the major areas in the CONOPS Document. Once functional area experts were
identified and contacted, the researcher sent a Risk Identification Survey to each expert.
The functional area experts identified risk events in each of their areas of expertise, down
to the third level of the CONOPS Document. Third, the researcher interviewed each
expert regarding his/her responses to resolve any ambiguities. Finally, the researcher
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1. M109FOV Fleet Management CONOPS
1.1 Overall Program Management Oversight
1.1.1 Contract Oversight
1.1.2 General Management
1.1.3 Requirements Determination (Top Level)
1.1.4 Budget and Execution
1.1.5 Long-term Planning
1.2 Fleet Lo gistical Support
1.2.1 Item Management
1.2.2 Physical Distribution Management
1.2.3 Maintenance Management
1.2.4 Facilities Planning Management
1.2.5 Material Fielding
1.2.6 Customer Support
1.2.7 Collect Performance Data
1.3 System Technical Support
1.3.1 Engineering
1.3.2 Configuration/Change Management
1.3.3 Test & Evaluation
1.3.4. Product Improvement
1.3.5 Customer Support
1.3.6 Life Cycle Software Support




1.4.4 End Item and Secondary Item Repair/Overhaul
Figure 4.1. Summary CONOPS Document [Ref. 21, as modified by researcher]
consolidated all the risk events identified by the functional area experts into their
respective CONOPS element. The consolidated list of risk events is shown in Appendix
B - The Ml 09 Fleet Management Risk Assessment Survey.
The second part of the risk assessment process, quantification, was also accomp-
lished through the use of surveys and interviews. First, the researcher developed a risk
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rating scheme built against an agreed set of definitions. This rating scheme helped to
eliminate some of the ambiguities in quantifying each risk event. Second, the researcher,
with the Deputy PM's assistance, identified a larger population of functional experts to
respond to the Risk Assessment Survey in Appendix B. Functional area experts who
responded to the Risk Identification Survey also responded to the Risk Assessment
Survey. Third, the researcher took the data received from the Risk Assessment Survey
and calculated the mean for each risk event for both cost and performance. This data was
then graphically portrayed utilizing DSMC's Risk Rating Diagram discussed in Chapter
III. Finally, the Risk Event Status (RES) was calculated for each risk event. Four Risk
Watchlists were developed, one for each of the four major areas, rank-ordering the most
severe risk events at the top with the relatively benign risk events at the bottom. The
researcher used this methodology to quantify the risk events for each of the four main
areas in the CONOPS Document.
The researcher received seven to nine assessment surveys from each of the four
major areas. Some respondents assessed more than one area. However, most of the
respondents assessed only one of the four major areas. Thus, there is limited significance
in comparing assessment results across the major areas.
D. SURVEYS
1. Risk Identification Survey
Risk identification is one of the most critical elements in the risk assessment
process since it identifies those areas which are perceived as being risky. Also, it
provides the foundation for transforming qualitative information into quantitative
information. [Ref. 7:p. 5-4] Since the Ml 09 Fleet Management Program is unique, the
researcher did not use the "analogy comparison" and "lessons learned technique" for risk
identification. Rather, the researcher relied exclusively on expert judgment through the
use of surveys and interviews. Thus, it was important for the researcher to identify the
appropriate individuals to respond to the surveys. The Deputy PM identified three to four
experts, in each of the four major areas of the CONOPS Document, to respond to the
surveys. The Deputy PM selected these individuals based on his assessment of their
technical knowledge and objectivity towards the program.
Surveys result in a collection of subjective judgments. People perceive risks
differently and exhibit different levels for risk taking. For example, older people are
generally perceived as being more risk adverse than younger people. Thus, there is no
guarantee for assuring that the data collected is the best possible. The only real "error" in
identifying the risks is in the methodology for collecting the data.
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The researcher used the same methodology to decrease the subjectivity of this
process. First, the researcher developed four surveys utilizing the summary CONOPS
Document (Figure 4.1). Second, the researcher contacted all the functional area experts
by phone to explain the purpose of the survey. Third, the researcher utilized the same
cover letter instructing the survey population on how to correctly fill out the survey.
Finally, the researcher interviewed each functional expert to ensure his/her input was
accurately understood by the researcher.
2. Risk Assessment Survey
The main objective of the Risk Assessment Survey is to take the qualitative
information derived from the Risk Identification Surveys and to transform this
information into quantitative risk estimates for each risk event identified. The researcher
attempted to quantify each risk event by calculating the RES for each risk event. As
discussed in Chapter III, the RES was calculated by multiplying the Likelihood of
Occurrence (LOO) by the Severity of Impact (SOI).
SOI for a program can be measured in terms of cost, schedule, and/or performance
consequences. The primary reason for establishing a Fleet Manager is to save money
while improving fleet support over the current system. Thus, the researcher only
considered cost and performance risks. Although there are schedule risks involved with
implementing the Fleet Management Concept, the main risks involved in the program
will occur as a consequence of meeting cost and performance objectives. Also, unlike a
new weapon system development, Fleet Management does not have the same critical
schedule implications associated with fielding a new system. As a result, the researcher
only assessed the SOI in terms of cost and performance to the fleet. The researcher
calculated the combined impact of cost and performance by adding these two categories
together. The average and standard deviation for LOO and SOI were calculated for each
risk event. This data was used to develop the Risk Rating Diagram for each major area in
the CONOPS Document. The RES for each risk event was calculated and a Risk Watch-
list for each major CONOPS area was developed.
As discussed earlier, different people exhibit various levels and degrees for taking
risks. It is common for two individuals to assess the same risk event differently. There
are many factors that contribute to these differences: age, experience, knowledge, job
position, job seniority, organizational assignment, personal involvement, etc. It is beyond
the scope of this research to analyze the impact of these different factors. The researcher
assigned equal weighting to each set of data, then consolidated the data to calculate the
average LOO and SOI for each risk event.
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The researcher attempted to create a baseline position by defining cost and
performance consequences on a meaningful scale. This scale is based on the govern-
ment's existing support system. Unfortunately, reliable cost and performance data for
each CONOPS element were not available. As a result, the researcher developed a
general scale that assessed the impact of the Fleet Manager's system to the Government's
existing system without utilizing any distinct cost and/or performance data. The
researcher utilized a 5-point scale for both Likelihood and Consequence to facilitate the
assessment process. The Risk Assessment Survey Scale is shown in Figures 4.2a and
4.2b below.
LIKELIHOOD:








Figure 4.2a. The Risk Assessment Survey Scale [Ref. 4]
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Source: Developed by Researcher.
Figure 4.2b. (Continued)
E. SURVEY RESULTS AND RISK WATCHLISTS
During the assessment process, the researcher assessed each major CONOPS area
separately. In each area there were approximately thirty to fifty risk events identified.
The complete rank-ordered list for the four major areas are listed in Appendix C. These
four watchlists are not all inclusive and there are undoubtedly several risk events that
have not been identified.
Many of the risk events were identified in several of the major CONOPS areas.
For example, the risk event "Contractor on the Battlefield" was identified as a significant
risk in three of the four major areas. In addition, many risk events were identified in
several different elements within the same area. For example, the risk event "Organic
Capability" was identified in all four third-level elements in the Maintenance/Manufac-
turing Area. In these particular cases, the researcher did not combine these risk events,
but treated each potential event as a separate entity.
As previously discussed, the researcher assessed each of the four major areas in
Fleet Management by developing separate Risk Assessment Graphs. Each point on the
graph represents a different risk event and was determined by calculating the average
LOO and SOI (Consequence) for each risk event. The points located in the upper right
hand corner represent the high risk area. The researcher did not attempt to determine a
break between high and low risk events. The researcher only labeled the "top-ten" risk
events in each graph, which is common practice in many risk assessment methodologies.
The numbers on the graph match the watchlist and represent the ten most severe risk
events in that area. The watchlists, with their corresponding RES, are shown below each
graph. The RES are used solely to prioritize the different risk events. These numbers do
not correspond to actual cost or performance metrics.
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1. Program Management






































Program Management Risk Watchlist
Ranking Risk Event RES Ranking Risk Event RES
1 Funding 24.5 6 Govt. Employee
Resistance
17





18.89 8 Unrealized Savings 16.91
4 Pricing 18 9 Organic Capability 16.91
5 Project Milestones 17.22 10 Transition Planning 16.67
Source: Developed by Researcher.
Figure 4.3. Program Management Risk Watchlist
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Fleet Logistical Support Risk Assessment
Graph
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Fleet Logistical Support Risk Watchlist
Ranking Risk Event RES Ranking Risk Event RES
1 FM Baseline Change 20.81 6 Contractor on the
Battlefield
18.22
2 Contractor on the 20.16 7 Govt. Changes - Down- 17.57
Battlefield sizing
3 Transition Planning 19 8 Deployed Operations 16.65
4 Parts Inventory 18.37 9 Repair Parts 16.65
Management Availability




Note: Risk #2 and #6, Contractor on the Battlefield, was identified in CONOPS Element 1.2.3 -
Maintenance and 1 .2.6 - Customer Support respectively.
Source: Developed by Researcher
Figure 4.4. Fleet Logistical Support Risk Watchlist
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3. System Technical Support
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System Technical Support Risk Watchlist
Ranking Risk Rating RES Ranking Risk Rating RES





2 Contractor on the
Battlefield
21.85 7 Unnecessary Changes 18.36
3 Funding 19.41 8 Modernization Thru
Spares
18
4 Program History &
Lessons Learned
19.4 9 Interoperability 17.88
5 Objectivity ofFM 19.05 10 TDP Changes 17.62
Conducting Test
Note: Since CONOPS Element 1.3.6 - Software Support will be performed by the Government,
the researcher did not include software risks in the assessment.
Source: Developed by Researcher.


































Ranking Risk Event RES Ranking Risk Event RES
1 Contractor on the 19.6
Battlefield













Note: Risk #1, #2, and #4, Contractor on the Battlefield, was identified in CONOPS Element
1.4.2 - Maintenance, 1.4.4 - End Item and Secondary Repair/Overhaul, and 1.4.3 - Modifications
and Conversions respectively. Risk #3 and #5, Organic Capability, was identified in CONOPS
Element 1.4.3 - Modifications and Conversions and 1.4.1 - Manufacturing respectively.
Source: Developed by Researcher.
Figure 4.6. Maintenance/Manufacturing Risk Watchlist
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F. SUMMARY
The risk assessment process is necessary in providing a structure for identifying
and ranking the different risk events in the program. For Fleet Management, the total
system evaluation was facilitated by the CONOPS Document which provided a
framework for organizing the risk events. The rating scheme in the surveys helped to
eliminate some of the ambiguities in the assessment process and provided a framework
for evaluating and quantifying the risks identified. The watchlist in each major area
provided the program with preliminary prioritization of the risks for further evaluation.
In the next chapter, the researcher will utilize the watchlists to analyze the impact the




This chapter discusses the methodology and results of the risk analysis process.
The transition from risk assessment activities (Chapter IV) to risk analysis activities is
usually very gradual. Tasks that are normally considered analysis activities are often
conducted during the assessment phase and vice-versa. [Ref. 7:p. 4-8] For example, the
researcher developed a preliminary watchlist in the assessment phase which is
traditionally developed in the analysis phase. Now, in the analysis phase, the researcher
will utilize this watchlist to determine the high risk elements in the CONOPS Document
and the potential impact these risk events can have on the program.
B. METHODOLOGY
The ultimate purpose of risk management is risk mitigation, which is the act of
revising either the scope, budget, quality, and/or schedule so that the project's uncertainty
is reduced without any significant impact on objectives. Risk mitigation requires analysis
in order to determine what impact these uncertainties have on the program. [Ref. 15:p.
890] The researcher accomplished this by applying the watchlist developed in Chapter
IV against the total program to determine the various degrees of risk throughout the
program.
The researcher used a graphical analysis technique by portraying the risks on an
WBS-organizational chart. The researcher developed four risk charts from the CONOPS
Document which graphically depict the risks by utilizing the watchlist developed in
Chapter IV. The first and second level in the risk charts correspond to the first and
second level of the CONOPS Document. The third level is a hierarchical lists of all the
risk events identified in each of the CONOPS elements. This level will list each risk
event in descending order according to its RES value.
The researcher developed a simple risk rating scale to categorized each risk event
as either high, medium, or low. To develop this scale, the researcher divided the range of
all the RES values into the three categories. The High Risk category corresponds to the
Top Ten Risk Event List developed in Chapter IV. Since there was no discernible break
between the medium and low risk categories, the researcher categorized the bottom ten
risk events as the Low Risk category. Thus, the remaining risk events were grouped into
the Medium Risk category and were designated as an area of concern for the PM.
47
The researcher will analyze each third-level element in the risk chart by applying
the risk rating scale. Analysis will focus on those elements that exhibit the greatest risk
according to the scale. This rating scale will graphically depict the high, medium, and
low risk areas for Fleet Management.
As discussed in Chapter IV, people perceive risks differently and exhibit various
comfort levels for risk taking. In the assessment phase, most of the surveys the
researcher received were from functional experts/managers who only assessed an area
that pertained to their specialty. As a result, the researcher will analyze each risk chart as
a separate entity and will not compare the various risk categories across the four major
areas of the CONOPS Document.
C. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT RISK CHART
One general conclusion that is readily apparent shown in Figure 5.1 is the high
degree of risk associated with Contract Oversight. Budgeting & Execution, which
contains the highest risk event in the Program Management Area, exhibits the next
highest degree of risk. Budgeting & Execution is followed by General Management and
Long Term Planning, which display a relatively equal amount of risk. Finally,
Requirements Determination exhibits the least amount of risk in the Program
Management area.
1. Contract Oversight - 1.1.1
The complexity and scope of the contract makes Contract Oversight the highest
risk element in this area. As previously stated, Fleet Management is a new and untested
concept. The Government has limited experience and institutional knowledge in
managing a contract of this size and scope. Unlike many programs within DoD, the PM
can not draw on past lessons-learned from other program offices to reduce uncertainties
and the subsequent mistakes that usually occur when executing a new concept. The PM
has to decide which functional specialists are necessary to provide the appropriate level of
knowledge and oversight for the contract. Too much oversight will reduce potential
savings and innovation. On the other hand, the PM still needs to retain the right
personnel to maintain a base level of knowledge and experience over the program. The
ultimate responsibility remains with the Government, and, as with any contracted effort,
the acceptance of the work still remains with the Government. Thus, the Government
needs to retain qualified personnel in both technical and management areas to execute the
program.
48

























































































R isk R ating Scale






























Top Ten Area of Concern Bottom Ten
Source: Developed by Researcher.
Figure 5.1. Program Management Risk Chart
Transition Planning is critical to implementing Fleet Management across DoD.
Currently, there are multiple commands/agencies that perform services for the Ml 09
FOV. The Program Office is responsible to ensure all Government agencies coordinate
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with the Fleet Manager on a synchronized transition schedule. Ineffective Transition
Planning will reduce the Fleet Manager's effectiveness and will result in missing critical
project milestones. Missed milestones in any one area or agency could have multiple
effects on other areas and/or agencies. This will ultimately detract from the potential
benefits sought from the Fleet Management Concept.
Unfavorable business conditions could result in Non-performance by the Fleet
Manager. The Fleet Manager's ultimate goal is to make a profit. If market conditions
cannot support this goal, the Fleet Manager might be forced to change its strategy and
reorganize. In addition, companies are bought and sold on a daily basis. If the Fleet
Manager is taken-over by another company, who is to say that the new company will
perform or care as much as the old company? In this situation, a corporate buy-out could
have a significant impact on the Fleet Manager's performance.
Although not in the top ten, Ineffective Contract Structure and Performance
Metrics and Incentives can have a significant impact on the Fleet Manager's performance.
The Government needs to ensure an effective contract structure is crafted that provides
the appropriate incentives to encourage the Fleet Manager to perform. These incentives
should be tied to performance metrics that save the Government money while improving
the life-cycle support of the fleet. As a result, the Government needs to establish and
monitor the correct performance metrics that will motivate the contractor to operate as
efficiently and effectively as possible.
2. Budget and Execution - 1.1.4
The next highest concentration of risks occurs in Budgeting and Execution. It's
not surprising that Funding received the highest RES score of all the risks identified.
Funding constraints are a major risk in virtually all DoD programs. Conceptually, Fleet
Management should save the Government millions of dollars each year. However, these
projected savings are long-term. Initially, Fleet Management will cost a substantial
amount of money to implement, and savings probably will not occur for several years .
Under the current fiscal environment, setting aside additional money to fund a new
program could be quite difficult.
Another major concern for the Government is the Fleet Manager's pricing
methodology on parts and services. The Government must have some control over
pricing to keep prices stable and consistent. Army units need consistent and affordable
prices in order to properly budget and forecast parts and services. The Fleet Manager
must determine the correct price for parts and services that will enable it to make a profit,
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while still achieving the program's objectives for cost savings and performance
improvements.
Under the Fleet Management Concept, the Fleet Manager should save the
Government millions annually by utilizing best business practices. Some projections
estimate savings up to 30%. If savings of this scale are not realized in a reasonable
amount of time, support for the Fleet Management Concept will probably decline. This
situation could have a negative impact on future program funding.
3. General Management - 1.1.2
General Management also exhibits a relatively high degree of risk. The highest
risk, Government Employee Resistance, will be very hard to predict. People usually do
not like change, especially when the change can influence retaining their job. Fleet
Management is a tremendous shift away from the status-quo and requires a cultural
change on the part of the Government. Cultural changes do not occur overnight, even in
the best organizations. Thus, we can expect some resistance to working with the Fleet
Manager on the part of Government employees. This resistance will have an impact on
the transition process and could affect potential savings.
Government Employee Unions oppose most outsourcing initiatives since they will
usually reduce the number ofjobs available for their members. Although the Ml 09 Fleet
Management Program will have limited effect on the amount of work available, the
Unions are concerned that subsequent Fleet Management Programs will substantially
affect the amount of work available for its members in the future. [Ref. 19:p. 24] As a
result, it is likely that the unions will not fully cooperate with implementing Fleet
Management. Thus, legal conflicts are likely to develop. Many of these legal conflicts,
which address retention of core work within the Government, will delay Fleet
Management implementation and could reduce potential savings.
4. Long-Term Planning - 1.1.5
Long-Term Planning requires that the planners have intimate knowledge of the
systems, their problems, and their potential solutions. Initially, the Fleet Manager will
possess limited knowledge and expertise concerning the fleet. As a result, it will be
difficult for the Fleet Manager to make informed decisions that affect long-term planning.
This could have a significant impact on achieving cost and performance objectives. Fleet
Management will require the Government to transfer most of its organic technical
functions to the Fleet Manager. Without this organic capability, the Government's ability
to make informed decisions will also become limited. In addition, the loss of program
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knowledge and technical interface by the Government, will also inhibit Government long-
term planning.
5. Requirements Determination - 1.1.3
Conceptually, Government and Fleet Manager interfaces should reduce the
uncertainty involved in Requirements Determination. During the transition process, the
Government will transfer historical data to the Fleet Manager that will enable the Fleet
Manager to adequately define requirements. As a result, the perceived risks in this area
are less. However, due to the scope and complexity of the Fleet Management Concept,
there are issues regarding parts ownership, obsolescence, surpluses, stock levels, and
inter-operability that must be resolved to achieve cost objectives. In addition, the Fleet
Manager must be able to respond to changing requirements on a daily basis. If the
Government is constrained in its ability to respond by contractual limitations, the
performance of the fleet will be affected.
D. FLEET LOGISTICAL SUPPORT RISK CHART
It is evident from Figure 5.2 that Item Management functions present the greatest
risk in the Fleet Logistical Support area. Physical Distribution, which is the second
highest risk element, also displays a relatively high degree of risk. Maintenance Manage-
ment and Customer Support are the third and fourth highest risk elements respectively
and exhibit a moderate degree of risk. The remaining elements, Facilities Management,
Material Fielding, and Collect Performance Data exhibit a low degree of risk in this area.
1. Item Management - 1.2.1
One reason for the high degree of risk associated with this element are all the
functions performed under Item Management. The CONOPS Document in Appendix A
shows all the functions associated with Item Management. These functions include
procurement, cataloging, repair, priority, distribution, and disposal. As a result, it is not
surprising that numerous risks were identified under this element. According to a
preliminary cost/benefit analysis, the Fleet Manager is projected to generate the greatest
amount of savings under Item Management. However, these potential savings are not
without numerous risks. First, as previously stated, transition planning is critical to
implementing Fleet Management. Under the best conditions, the Government should still
anticipate unplanned contingencies that could delay implementation.
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Source: Developed by Researcher.
Figure 5.2. Fleet Logistical Support Risk Chart
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Currently, there are over 4000 Ml 09 unique parts worth over $120 million. The
Government must transfer control of this inventory to the Fleet Manager and support the
fleet at the same time. Unfortunately, there are still many issues regarding Parts
Inventory Management. For example, how much control will the Government transfer to
the Fleet Manager regarding stock levels and location of stock? More Governmental
control will probably results in less cost savings. There are also many questions
concerning the range of supply parts provided by the Fleet Manager. Should the Fleet
Manager provide all unique and common Ml 09 parts, just Ml 09 unique parts, or just
critical parts? Each variation presents various risks that will require the Fleet Manager to
implement a different approach to satisfy the requirement. Uncertainty in the disposition
of obsolete parts will also affect potential cost savings. Finally, there is also concern over
whether the Fleet Manager can respond rapidly to contingencies. Again, the Government
cannot be constrained by contractual limitations in its ability to respond to contingencies.
2. Physical Distribution - 1.2.2
Physical Distribution exhibits the next highest degree of risk in Fleet Logistical
Support since it contains the second largest number of High and Medium Risks. The
Fleet Manager must be able to provide responsive support to deployed Army units. This
situation presents many risks involving communication, safety, and transportation. Direct
delivery of parts using commercial vendors may not be practical in certain parts of the
world. As a result, the Fleet Manager and the Government will have to use alternate
means to deliver parts and services which would probably lower potential savings.
There are also questions concerning the availability of repair parts. The Fleet
Manager will be required to coordinate and establish business relationships with
numerous vendors. Accomplishing these tasks takes time. As a result, it is unlikely that
the Fleet Manager will have control over all the factors in its procurement operations.
Although not in the top-ten, Communication Capability presents many challenges
to the Fleet Manager. Conceptually, the Fleet Manager is expected to communicate with
units using internet technology that is compatible with the Army Technical Architecture.
Unfortunately, not all deployed units have access to the internet. In addition, current
Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS) hardware and software are not compatible with
internet technology. [Ref. 19:p. 7] As a result, the Government will be forced to procure
additional equipment to establish a direct link between the user and the Fleet Manager.
3. Maintenance Management - 1.2.3
Maintenance Management is also considered a high risk element since it contains
two very high risk events. First, changing requirements could affect the Fleet Manager's
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baseline for both services and personnel requirements. Unanticipated user requirements
could result in unplanned expenses which would have an impact on projected savings.
Second, the Fleet Manager is expected to provide the necessary expertise and information
to maintain fielded systems throughout their life cycle. This will require the Fleet
Manager to provide support to deployed units in war zones. The availability of support in
this situation is uncertain and will depend on the perceived threat. High threat situations
will likely limit support and could have a severe impact on performance.
4. Customer Support - 1.2.6
Survey results indicate that the Fleet Manager should provide adequate Customer
Support during peacetime. However, in a hostile environment, the Fleet Manager will be
limited in its ability to perform Customer Support functions. It is unlikely that the Fleet
Manager will be as responsive in war zones as in a secure environment. This will affect
the Fleet Manager's ability to provide technical and administrative support to its
customers. In addition, the inability of the Fleet Manager to establish communications
with deployed units will impact on Customer Support. Although these issues sound
serious, the perceived risk in this area from the surveys still appears to be moderate.
5. Material Fielding - 1.2.5
The surveys only identified three risk events for this element. One reason could
be the controlled environment in which new equipment is usually fielded. However,
there are issues concerning Funding and Doctrinal Changes that could affect the Fleet
Manager's ability to properly field a new piece of equipment. As a result, the researcher
considers Material Fielding to be a moderate to low risk element.
6. Facilities Management - 1.2.4
Facilities Management displays a relatively small amount of risk. Again, the
controlled environment in which these activities occur could account for this assessment.
There are issues regarding the physical building and equipment required by the Fleet
Manager to maintain and store equipment. Fortunately, most of these concerns should be
mitigated through the source selection process. As a result, Facilities Management is
considered a low risk element.
7. Collect Performance Data - 1.2.6
Although this element contains five different risk events, most of these risk events
were assessed in the Low Risk category. One explanation could be the lack of
complexity involved in performing this function. Also, it is generally assumed that the
Fleet Manager will have access to applicable Government data bases and that Sample
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Data Collection activities will not change. Thus, Collect Performance Data is considered
a low risk element.
E. SYSTEM TECHNICAL SUPPORT RISK CHART
Compared to Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2, the High and Medium Risk Events in
Figure 5.3 appear to be more evenly distributed throughout the different elements in
System Technical Support. Engineering, Product Improvement, and
Configuration/Change Management all exhibit a relatively high degree of risk. Customer
Support displays a high-to-moderate degree of risk due to the number of Medium Risk
Events. Finally, Test & Evaluation displays the least amount of risk in the System
Technical Support area.
1. Engineering - 1.3.1
Survey results indicate a high degree of risk in this area. This is not surprising
due to the wide range of activities included in this element. The Fleet Manager is
expected to establish a broad-based technical capability that will provide for all technical
activities needed for life-cycle support. To accomplish this, the Fleet Manager is
expected to implement innovative approaches that will improve reliability, maintain-
ability, and performance. However, there appears to be little incentive for the Fleet
Manager to improve engineering functions when he is also making a profit on selling
spare parts.
The Fleet Manager must acquire the technical expertise in many functional
disciplines such as: cannon technology, explosives, hydraulics, fire control, and
armament. Functional expertise in these areas is not readily-available in commercial
industry and takes time to assimilate. In addition, the Fleet Manager will most likely
have limited knowledge of the program's history and lessons-learned. These factors
could have an impact on the Fleet Manager's ability to implement the numerous
engineering functions that are necessary to achieve performance objectives.
Communications interoperability is a critical requirement for Force XXI. The
Fleet Manager must be able to design for communication interoperability between all
systems on the battlefield. This will require a tremendous amount of knowledge and
expertise on the part of the Fleet Manager regarding other battlefield operating systems. If
the Fleet Manager doesn't have this knowledge, communications with other systems will
not occur which could degrade combat effectiveness.
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Source: Developed by Researcher.
Figure 5.3. System Technical Support Risk Chart
2. Product Improvement - 1.3.4
Funding uncertainties make Product Improvement a high risk element. The Fleet
Manager is expected to implement new products and processes that will improve weapon
system performance. Again, funding uncertainties can negatively impact the Fleet
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Manager's ability to field new products. These constraints could affect performance
objectives. The Fleet Manager is expected to modernize spare parts by providing better
performing and more cost-effective spare parts from its vendors. Presently, the
Government has difficulty achieving this objective due to the large number of vendors
and parts. Initially, the Fleet Manager could experience similar problems which could
impact on cost and performance data. Fielding new products will likely change
requirements for parts and services. This will require additional unplanned coordination
which could affect potential savings.
The Fleet Manager is expected to stay abreast of all new developmental activities
within DoD and industry in order to identify new opportunities for product
improvements. Identifying all possible product improvement opportunities will require a
large research effort by the Fleet Manager which could detract from projected savings.
The Fleet Manager must also receive approval from the Government to buy new products
and services. This requires close coordination and a shared understanding of all objec-
tives and constraints between the Government and the Fleet Manager.
3. Configuration/Change Management - 1.3.2
Sound configuration management procedures are critical for ensuring accurate and
up-to-date technical data packages (TDPs). On the surface, these procedures do not
appear to be difficult. However, the surveys indicate that there are several High Risk
Events associated with performing these activities. As the sole provider of M109-unique
parts, the Fleet Manager will control configuration tracking and change management.
Thus, the transition of this function from the Government to the Fleet Manager is critical.
Incompatible Configuration Management processes could have an impact on a TDP's
accuracy which could affect performance. If the Fleet Manager is not familiar with all
the TDPs, the Fleet Manager might generate unnecessary changes which would degrade
cost savings. In addition, the Fleet Manager could inadvertently make changes to TDPs
that could affect interoperability of parts between systems. This situation would affect
the fleet's performance and would require additional TDP redesign. Finally, the Fleet
Manager would have the ability to make TDP changes that could limit or prevent future
competition. This would give the current Fleet Manager tremendous leverage over the
Government when competing subsequent contracts. Thus, particular attention should be
paid to how configuration changes are approved and to the membership of the Configura-
tion Control Board.
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4. Customer Support - 1.3.5
Due to the number of Medium Risk Events, Customer Support is considered a
high to moderate risk element. Contractor on the battlefield is a recurring risk event that
affects numerous CONOPS Elements. Again, it is nearly impossible to measure the
impact of this risk on performance; however, it is likely that the Fleet Manager's
customer support operations will be affected. In order to provide adequate support to its
customers, the Fleet Manager must establish direct communications with its customers
worldwide. Unfortunately, there are many Army units, particularly those deployed, who
do not have access to internet technology. In addition, current use of the Standard Army
Management Information System (STAMIS) loses many of the advantages of a direct
link between the Fleet Manager and its customers which could negatively impact on Fleet
Management performance objectives. [Ref. 19:p. 7] To correct this problem, two
alternatives exist. First, hardware and software modifications can be made to existing
systems. Many people favor this solution since only one computer is required; however,
the ability to upgrade capability will probably be reduced. The second solution requires
the acquisition of a laptop computer based system. Purchasing new systems will result in
significant procurement, fielding, and training expenses. Regardless of which option is
selected, hardware and software changes are needed to establish a direct link between the
Fleet Manager and its customers. This expense could have a substantial impact on
projected savings.
5. Test & Evaluation - 1.3.3
Test & Evaluation exhibits the least amount of risk in this area and is considered a
moderate risk element. One reason could be the controlled nature in which Testing and
Evaluations are conducted. Nevertheless, there are several issues that should be
addressed. First, the Fleet Manager will be responsible to plan, coordinate, and manage
the conduct of all testing. To achieve performance objectives, the Fleet Manager must
conduct these tests in an objective manner. However, if the Fleet Manager designs, tests,
and approves the configuration, there are opportunities for the Fleet Manager to conduct
inefficient and ineffective tests which could impact on cost and performance objectives.
In addition, there is concern over the Fleet Manager's ability to obtain the expertise and
resources necessary to conduct Test & Evaluations correctly.
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F. MANUFACTURING/MAINTENANCE RISK CHART
Similar to the System Technical Support Risk Chart, Manufacturing/Maintenance
risk categories are widely-distributed throughout all of the elements (See Figure 5.4).
Manufacturing/Maintenance Risk Analysis
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Figure 5.4. Manufacturing/Maintenance Risk Chart
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Due to the degree and number of High Risk Events, Maintenance appears to be the
highest risk element in this area. Maintenance is closely followed by both Manufacturing
and Modifications & Conversions, which exhibit a relatively equal amount of risk.
Finally, End Item & Secondary Item Repair exhibits the least amount of risk in this area.
A more interesting observation is that most of the risk events were identified in several of
the elements. For example, Organic Capability, Commercial Business Practices,
Technical Data, Contractor on the Battlefield, Facilities & Equipment, and Experience &
Technical Expertise were identified in at least three of the four elements. One reason for
the recurring risk events is the similarity of the functions performed in each of these
elements.
1. Maintenance - 1.4.2
Due to the variety of maintenance activities required by the Fleet Manager,
Maintenance presents the greatest amount of uncertainty in this area. The Fleet Manager
is expected to provide service representatives at the field level to support Army unit-level
maintenance activities. Maintenance support must be continuous: in peace-time and in
war, for CONUS-based units, and for deployed units. As previously discussed, there are
a lot of uncertainties involved during times of war which are hard to measure. Also, the
Government needs to define the level at which the Fleet Manager will support unit-level
maintenance functions. If the Fleet Manager is only present at the Main Support
Battalion (division-level), it is unlikely that support will be very responsive at the
battery/battalion-level
.
The Fleet Manager is expected to deploy with units to remote areas. In these
situations, the Fleet Manager might not have access to maintenance tools and equipment.
Also, conventional transportation of repair parts may not be available to remote areas. In
these cases, the Fleet Manager would have to develop alternate plans for providing
maintenance support which could impact on cost objectives. Finally, the surveys indicate
that the Government will assume risk by losing high echelon maintenance expertise.
2. Modification & Conversions - 1.4.3
Modification & Conversions possess a high degree of risk for many of the same
reasons stated above. However, due to the scope of the activities involved in this
element, the perceived risk appears to be slightly lower than in Maintenance. The Fleet
Manager must have the capability to alter and upgrade existing systems regardless of
location. First, the Fleet Manager must have the appropriate expertise to perform
modifications and conversions. Initially, it is unlikely that the Fleet Manager will have
the unique weapon system expertise in all functional disciplines. As a result, the
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Government will be forced to help the Fleet Manager develop this expertise. Once the
Government transfers this expertise to the Fleet Manager, the Government now faces the
risk of not having the required program knowledge and expertise that is needed for
decision making and contingencies. Second, the Fleet Manager might be required to
perform upgrades and modifications in war zones. Many of the issues concerning the
Contractor on the Battlefield risk event have already been discussed and still apply.
3. Manufacturing - 1.4.1
Manufacturing is a high risk element and appears to exhibit the same degree of
risk as Modification & Conversions. Although Manufacturing activities occur in a
relatively secure environment, these activities can be affected by other external factors.
For example, Labor/Management disputes can delay production schedules and fielding
timelines. Also, there are many uncertainties involved in acquiring the necessary Organic
Capability needed to manufacture end items and secondary items. The Organic
Capability issues addressed in Modifications & Conversions also apply to Manufacturing.
4. End Item & Secondary Item Repair - 1.4.4
End Item & Secondary Item Repair exhibits the least amount of risk on the risk
chart. One reason for the lower perceived risk could be the limited scope of activities
included in this area. Presently, the depots perform much of this work and it is unlikely
that the depots will turn over these activities to the Fleet Manager. Nonetheless, there are
still several issues that should be addressed. Again, Contractor on the Battlefield
becomes a major concern when these activities occur in a hostile environment. Also, the
lack of appropriate facilities, equipment, and trained personnel can affect the Fleet
Manager's performance in these activities. As a result, End Item & Secondary Item
Repair is considered a moderate risk element.
G. SUMMARY
The main objective of the risk analysis process is to determine where the risks are
likely to occur and the magnitude or impact of these risks on the program. The researcher
used the watchlist developed in Chapter IV and applied the watchlist to the CONOPS
Document to accomplish this objective. Listed below are the highest risk elements in




High Risk Element - Contract Oversight - 1.1.1
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2. Fleet Logistical Support - 1 .2
High Risk Element - Item Management - 1.2.1
3. System Technical Support - 1.3
High Risk Elements - Engineering - 1.3.1
4. Manufacturing/Maintenance - 1 .4
High Risk Elements - Maintenance - 1 .4.2
The final step in the risk management process is Risk Handling, which is
discussed in Chapter III. Risk Handling addresses the specifics on what should be done,
when it should be done, who is responsible, and the impact of the action or inaction. The
Program Office can now take the results derived from the assessment and analysis phase
to develop the most appropriate strategy to obtain an acceptable risk level in each of the
four major areas, given program constraints and objectives.
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VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The purpose of this thesis was to conduct a risk assessment and analysis of the
Ml 09 FOV Fleet Management Pilot Program. Fleet Management is a new initiative by
the Army to place a single entity, a Fleet Manager, in charge of maintaining the Ml 09
FOV Fleet. The overall goal of this program is to reduce operational and support costs
while improving weapon system performance. The general approach in achieving this
goal is to implement both better commercial business practices and to outsource logistical
support functions. Unfortunately, there are many uncertainties in implementing a fleet
management approach for sustaining a major weapon system. Thus, it is imperative to
develop a formal risk management plan that can identify, assess, analyze, control, and
document all the risks associated with the program.
DoD's acquisition process has designed, fielded, and sustained world-class
weapon systems for decades. The superior performance of U.S. systems was
demonstrated during the Gulf War. Although this acquisition process has been very
effective in accomplishing its mission, budgetary constraints have forced DoD to adopt
new processes to improve efficiency. Many officials advocate reducing the support infra-
structure as the first step in improving DoD's efficiency. In the QDR, Secretary Cohen
emphasizes that the military must change in response to today's fiscal environment. DoD
must be more efficient and cost-effective to serve the warfighter faster, better, and
cheaper. [Ref. I0:Section VIII p. 1]
Presently, DoD maintains a huge infrastructure that consumes a large and growing
portion of DoD's budget. Over the last several years, infrastructure reductions have
lagged force structure reductions by over 10%. As a result, the SECDEF firmly believes
that the defense infrastructure must be reduced further to keep pace with force structure
reductions and to eliminate inefficiency. According to the SECDEF, Joint Vision 2010
will require a radically different support structure that will force DoD to reengineer its
infrastructure. A critical part of this reengineering process is to outsource more non-
warfighting DoD support functions. [Ref. 10:Section VIII, p. 2]
The Ml 09 Fleet Management Program supports this reengineering effort by
outsourcing those functions that make sense and can be performed more efficiently by a
private contractor. To assess and analyze the risks associated with the program, the
researcher first discusses the Government's policy on outsourcing and outlines the goals
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and objectives for Fleet Management. Next, the author provides a brief overview on the
risk management process and discusses DoD's policy pertaining to risk management.
Finally, the author describes the methodology used to conduct the risk assessment and
analysis process. This chapter provides a summary of the study, recommendations, and
areas for further research.
1. Outsourcing and Fleet Management Overview
Over the past several years there have been numerous studies citing the benefits of
outsourcing. The CORM and the DSB believe DoD can save 30% or more by
outsourcing more commercial-type functions. Secretary Cohen also believes that DoD
can achieve greater efficiencies by outsourcing more non-warfighting activities. The
Secretary feels that DoD should redefine its concept of core activities by narrowing the
scope to include only those activities that are "inherently Governmental." Secretary
Cohen outlines the Depart-ment's evolving policy on outsourcing in Section VIII of the
QDR: Achieving a 21st Century Defense Infrastructure. In the QDR, Secretary Cohen
supports an aggressive outsourcing policy by encouraging the Services to outsource
infrastructure functions that are closely related to commercial functions. Past experience
indicates that DoD can enjoy many of the same benefits that private industry has gained
from outsourcing - "tighter focus on core tasks; better service quality; more
responsiveness and agility; better access to new technologies; and lower costs." [Ref.
10:Section VIII
,
p. 2] In addition to the advantages cited in the QDR, many proponents
of outsourcing argue that contracting out services normally performed by the Government
promotes competition which stimulates the economy. This increased competition is
usually followed by economic efficiency.
Unfortunately, outsourcing will not achieve these benefits in all cases.
Government officials should evaluate each potential outsourcing initiative on a case-by-
case basis. In many cases, outsourcing a proposed function may be impossible due to
statutory restrictions and/or regulations. Also, there are many potential disadvantages
that must be considered. First, commanders are forced to give up control over critical
resources when they transfer the responsibility to a contractor. Second, in many markets
where there is limited competition, industry will gain tremendous leverage over the
Government when setting prices. Thus, economic efficiencies will not be achieved.
These situations can also foster an environment that can lead to fraud and abuse. Finally,
the Government will be saddled with the additional cost of initiating the procurement
process. More importantly, achieving the benefits of outsourcing assumes the
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Government will develop a contract that is beneficial to both the Government and
industry. This is very difficult, especially for large complex service contracts.
The Ml 09 Fleet Management Pilot Program hopes to achieve the benefits of
outsourcing by contracting out those logistical support functions that can be performed
more efficiently by private industry. This approach places one contractor in charge of
maintaining the fleet. The Government does not abdicate its responsibility of maintaining
the fleet, but transfers those functions to a private contractor who can manage and
perform these functions more efficiently. The goal of the Pilot Program is to generate
significant savings in life-cycle support costs by applying best business practices, stream-
lining the supply pipeline, and implementing technological improvements. These savings
can be redirected to improve operational readiness and performance by continuously
modernizing spare parts and components. In addition, the Fleet Manager will establish a
communications and support infrastructure that will provide better and more responsive
support to its customers worldwide.
Presently, the scope of the Ml 09 Fleet Management Program is still evolving.
Conceptually, the Government will achieve the greatest efficiency by broadening the
scope of the Fleet Manager's functions. Thus, the Government developed the Concept of
Operations (CONOPS) Document, which outlines all the functions performed by the
Government to sustain the fleet. Initially, the Government considered all the functions
contained in this document; thus, it represents all the potential functions that could be
outsourced to the Fleet Manager (see Appendix A). The Pilot Program is subdivided into
three major areas: Fleet Logistical Support, System Technical Support, and
Manufacturing/Maintenance. Each of these major areas major areas are further
subdivided into lower elements. In Chapter II, the researcher describes these third-level
elements in detail. To date, only Life-Cycle Software Support, element 1.3.6, has been
removed from Fleet Management. This element will be performed by the Government.
2. Risk Management Overview
Risk can be defined as a measure of the inability to achieve project objectives
within defined cost, schedule, and technical constraints. Risk involves uncertainty and
has two components: (1) the probability of failing to achieve a particular outcome and
(2) the consequence of failing to achieve that outcome. As a new and untested concept,
there are numerous uncertainties associated with implementing the Fleet Management
Concept. As a result, it is essential to conduct a formal and deliberate risk management
process. Project Management Institute defines risk management as the "processes
concerned with identifying, analyzing, and responding to project risks." [Ref. 22:p. Ill]
67
This process includes maximizing the results of positive events (opportunities) and
minimizing the consequences of negative events (risk events). PMI's approach contains
four major processes: Risk Identification, Risk Quantification, Risk Response
Development, and Risk Response Control.
The DoD Risk Management Process that is taught to the acquisition workforce is
contained in current DSMC publications. Unlike PMI's approach, DSMC's process is
from a program office's viewpoint and is only concerned with minimizing the
consequences of adverse events. Also, DSMC's approach contains four different major
processes: Risk Planning, Risk Assessment, Risk Analysis, Risk Handling. Although
both approaches are slightly different, their overall objective is essentially the same: to
develop a formal and systematic process to identify, assess, analyze, control, and
document risk events throughout the life of the project.
Program managers of Defense acquisition programs are responsible for ensuring
risk management plans are effective. The 1996 updates to DoD Directive 5000.1 and
DoD 5000.2R have significantly increased emphasis on the importance of risk
management in managing Defense acquisition systems. These documents state that
program managers are to use risk management plans to identify and track risk events,
define risk abatement plans, and provide continuous risk assessment throughout each
acquisition phase to deter-mine how risks have changed. [Ref. 16:p. 2] Specifically,
DoD 5000.1 requires that risk management plans be assessed at each milestone decision
point before approval is granted to proceed into the next acquisition phase. DoD 5000.2R
requires the program manager to establish a formal risk management program with
industry and user involvement.
3. Risk Assessment
The researcher used DSMC's approach to conduct the risk assessment process for
the M 1 09 Fleet Management Program. The first step in the assessment process, Risk
Identifica-tion, was accomplished by surveys and interviews. The researcher used the
CONOPS Document (Appendix A) as a preliminary WBS that provided a framework for
identifying and organizing the risk events. The next step, Risk Quantification, took the
qualitative information derived from the Risk Identification Surveys and transformed this
information into quantitative risk estimates for each risk event. Again, the researcher
used the CONOPS Document as a tool to develop the Risk Assessment Surveys
(Appendix B). The researcher developed a risk rating scale for the survey that provided a
framework for evaluating and quantifying the risk events. Once all assessment surveys
were collected and consolidated, an RES was calculated for each risk event. The RES for
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each risk event enabled the researcher to identify the most significant risk events in each
of the program's major areas. The researcher portrayed the quantitative results from the
surveys in the form of a Risk Rating Diagram. These Risk Rating Diagrams (Chapter IV)
identify the top-ten risk events for each major area. The end result of the Risk
Assessment Process was the development of a Risk Event Watchlist. The researcher
developed four Risk Event Watchlists, one for each of the program's major areas. The
complete Risk Event Watchlists are listed in Appendix C.
4. Risk Analysis
The researcher had two primary goals in the risk analysis process: first, determine
which areas in the program exhibit the highest degree of risk; second, analyze the
potential impact, on cost and/or performance, that high risk events have on the program.
To accomplish these goals, the researcher used a graphical analysis technique by
portraying the risk events on a risk chart. The CONOPS Document provided a frame-
work for developing the risk charts. A hierarchical list of all risk events, with their
corresponding RES values, were listed under each third-level CONOPS element. The
researcher developed a risk rating scale to categorize each risk event as either high,
medium, or low based on their RES values. The risk charts in Chapter V graphical
portray the high risk areas in the program. The researcher developed four risk charts, one
for each of the program's major areas.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The researcher recommends the PM use the Risk Event Watchlists and the Risk
Charts to develop the Program's Risk Handling Plan. The Risk Event Watchlists identify
the most serious risk events associated with the program and are a convenient way to
track and prioritize the different risk events. The Risk Charts categorize the different risk
events and help to identify the high risk areas in the CONOPS Document. Both products
are valuable risk management tools and should be utilized in developing risk mitigation
strategies.
Critical to successful Risk Management is the PM's ability to control or handle
the different risk events. Risk Handling is the action or inaction taken by the program
office to address the different risk events associated with the program. [Ref 7:pp. 4-10]
The PM should develop an appropriate strategy necessary to obtain an acceptable risk
level for the program, given program constraints and objectives.
During the risk assessment process, the researcher identified both internal and
external risk events. It is necessary for the PM to distinguish between these two types of
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risks to efficiently use his resources to mitigate and control the different risk events. It is
primarily the PM's responsibility to control internal risk events. On the other hand, it is
primarily a higher headquarter' s responsibility, such as the Department of the Army (DA)
or the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), to control external risks. However, the
PM does play a role in controlling external risks and should use his influence to reduce
external risks whenever possible.
1. External Risks
There are numerous risk areas that are external to the program office that the PM
must be able to identify. Often, the PM will be forced to modify his acquisition strategy
based on these external factors. These areas are discussed below. [Ref. 6:p. 4.5-3]
1 . Funding. Funding is the greatest external risk that can affect the program.
Almost all support tasks are based on having appropriate funding levels. Changes to the
funding level can have a significant impact on the program's success. The program's
acquisition strategy is based on its anticipated funding level and without adequate and
consistent funding, performance on the contract will suffer. As a result, the PM must
prioritize those tasks that are critical to sustain the fleet in the field. From the risk charts,
there are several high risk events related to this area.
2. Threats and Requirements. No one can predict with certainty the threat
in five or ten years. As a result, it is impossible to determine the exact requirements
needed to support the fleet into the twenty-first century. Many of the support tasks in the
Fleet Logistical Support area are developed based on certain requirements. Changing
these requirements can have a serious impact on Fleet Manager's ability to support the
Fleet. Thus, the Program Office and the Fleet Manager must remain flexible to respond
to these changing requirements.
3. Politics. Although Fleet Management is not a new system development
program, there are many external sources involved in Fleet Management. As a result,
politics will play a major role in deciding the scope of the program. The PM must be
cognizant of this political environment and know all the stakeholders in the program and
their agendas. This will enable the PM to foster relationships with external sources that
can benefit the program and reduce uncertainty. Although the PM cannot control these
external risk areas, he must monitor their impact on accomplishing the program's
objectives.
DoD's complex acquisition process has created an uncertain environment that can
prevent or hinder successful outsourcing initiatives from realizing their full potential. As
a result, it is OSD's and DA's responsibility to recommend and implement policy
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changes that will reduce this uncertain environment for the PM. Below are several policy
recommendations that OSD and/or DA could adopt to reduce the risks associated with the
Ml 09 Fleet Management Program and outsourcing in general.
First, OSD should set forth funding guidance for outsourcing initiatives in the
Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). This will require the Services to allocate appropriate
funding to outsourcing initiatives when they submit their biannual Program Objective
Memorandums (POMs). Although this is difficult given current fiscal constraints, DoD
needs to make the necessary investment up-front in order to realize the potential benefits
of Fleet Management.
Second, OSD should work with congressional leaders to remove statutory
requirements and restrictions. To realize the potential benefits of outsourcing, decisions
on outsourcing a particular function should be made on the capability and reliability of
the service provider, not on a regulation. Third, OSD should work to establish a formal
policy regarding a contractor's involvement in a hostile environment (i.e., a war zone).
This policy should set forth procedures that will enhance the contractor's responsiveness
to the user, while offering safeguards to contractor. Fourth, OSD and DA should address
personnel matters proactively and should provide early and sustained communication to
all DoD personnel. Fleet Management could displace Government employees. As a
result, OSD should consider policies for appropriate retraining, outplacement, and
severance packages for all displaced employees. Finally, a cultural change is needed to
change DoD's support infrastructure. This cultural change will require the SECDEF's
role on outsourcing initiatives to be highly-visible and sustained. Thus, the SECDEF
should issue a formal policy statement promoting outsourcing opportunities and should
require service secretaries to establish similar policy statements.
2. Internal Risks
As previously discussed in Chapter III, there are four primary methods for
handling risk events associated with the program. These methods include Risk
Avoidance, Risk Control, Risk Assumption, and Risk Transfer. The PM needs to
conscientiously use these methods to control each risk event throughout the life of the
program. The following discussion illustrates how the PM can apply these methods to
handle the risks associated with Fleet Management. [Ref. 15:p. 895]
1
.
Risk Avoidance. The PM can reduce uncertainty in the program by
eliminating the source of the risk. For example, in the System Technical Support area,
the Product Improvement element was assessed as a high risk. The PM can reduce or
mitigate this risk by eliminating this requirement in the contract. Unfortunately, not all
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risk events can be totally avoided. An action that avoids one risk may simply transfer
that risk to another area. The source selection process also allows the PM to avoid
unwanted risks. An effective source selection board will help the PM identify short-
comings of competitive sources to avoid sources having unacceptable risks.
2. Risk Control. Controlling risks involves the development of a risk
reduction plan and then following that plan. This will require the PM to develop fall-
back positions for different risk events. For example, the PM can require the Fleet
Manager to develop an alternative distribution method to ensure parts are delivered to its
customers on time. Tracking high risk areas requires the PM to develop appropriate
performance metrics that are easy to monitor and measure. Earned Value Management
Tools such as Performance Analyzer can also assist the PM in tracking cost and schedule
risks in high risk areas.
3. Risk Assumption. Due to budget constraints, the PM does not have the
resources to control all the risks associated with Fleet Management. As a result, the PM
will be forced to assume some of the risks involved in implementing the program.
However, it is critical that the PM assumes the "right" risks such as those with either low
probability, low consequences, or both. For example, the risk events labeled Low Risk
on the risk charts in Chapter V should be accepted before the Medium or High Risks are
accepted.
4. Risk Transfer. The PM should also attempt to transfer the risks from the
Government to the Fleet Manager whenever possible. Options for risk transfer include
product performance incentives, warranties, cost incentives, and performance bonds. In
addition, selecting the appropriate contract type will transfer part of the risk to the Fleet
Manager.
Once the appropriate method for controlling each risk event has been selected, the
PM should continually document the process. Documentation should address the
specifics on what should be done, when it should be done, who is responsible, and the
impact of the action or inaction of the risk handling technique. As previously discussed,
an effective risk management program requires early and continual involvement from the
entire program team. As a result, the researcher recommends periodical risk management
reviews to update and assess the effectiveness of the risk management plan. The entire
program team, to include the Fleet Manager and User Representatives, should attend
these reviews.
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3. Areas for Risk Handling Emphasis
From the assessment and analysis portions of this thesis, the researcher identified
several interrelated areas which, if emphasized in risk handling, would have potentially
high payoffs throughout the program. First, the Fleet Management contract structure will
affect all major areas in the program. Thus, it is critical for the Government to develop a
contract that allows the Fleet Manager maximum flexibility to implement best business
practices whenever possible. At the same time, the Government must provide the
appropriate incentives that will motivate the contractor to achieve the desired results that
will not conflict with other program objectives. In addition, it is important for the
Government to create measurable metrics for contract performance that do not create an
unnecessary administra-tive burden. If the Government can not accomplish these critical
tasks, multiple areas throughout the program will be affected. Second, the Government
must develop accurate cost estimates for all activities throughout the program. The goal
of Fleet Management is to achieve significant cost-savings on virtually all life-cycle
support activities. This will require the Government to determine an accurate baseline
cost for each proposed outsourced function. A Preliminary Cost Benefit Analysis has
determined "rough estimates" for several areas in the program. However, there is little
confidence in these figures. If the Government cannot develop an accurate cost model to
predict costs and savings, the program will not achieve its stated goals. Finally,
personnel management will impact on practically every function included in the program.
Thus, it is essential for the PM to determine the right mix of qualified Government
employees in the program. These employees will perform several critical functions that
will enable Fleet Management to succeed. First, they will help provide oversight on the
contract. Second, they will establish the necessary interfaces with the Fleet Manager that
will allow the Government to effectively coordinate activities in support of the fleet.
Third, they will establish a cooperative and professional relationship with the Fleet
Manager that is based on mutual respect and trust. The PM must also work closely with
the Fleet Manager to ensure that it has the appropriate skills in its workforce to perform
all the activities in the contract.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The following are suggested areas for further research:
1
.
Conduct a risk assessment and analysis of the program once the scope for
Fleet Management has been finalized. To date, the scope of activities included under the
Fleet Management Concept is still evolving. Once the RFP is finalized and the contract
is awarded, the risk assessment and analysis contained in this research can be updated.
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Students selecting this topic could use the actual WBS instead of the CONOPS
Document. In addition, the student can broaden the survey population by including more
people outside the Program Office.
2. Conduct a risk assessment and analysis of the program using a different
methodology and/or technique. There are numerous techniques and software tools
available to the PM to conduct a risk assessment and analysis of the program. Students
selecting this approach can select one of these alternative technique. For example,
students could use Decision Analysis or Transition Templates to assess and analyze the
different risk events.
3. Analyze the Risk Management Plan developed by the Program Office.
Students selecting this topic can analyze the risk handling techniques employed by the
Program Office to mitigate the different risks. Specifically, students can evaluate the
effectiveness of these techniques and offer alternative methods for reducing program
risks.
4. Analyze the different outsourcing initiatives implemented by all the
Services. Students selecting this topic can compare and contrast the different outsourcing
initiatives throughout DoD. Specifically, the student can evaluate the effectiveness of
these initiatives in accomplishing their goals. Also, the student can uncover trends and
pathologies that could be beneficial for future outsourcing initiatives.
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APPENDIX A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) DOCUMENT
1. Ml 09 FOV Fleet Management ConOps
1 .
1
Overall Program Management Oversight
1.1.1 Contract Oversight







1.1.3 Requirements Determination (Top Level)
1 . 1 .4 Budget and execution
1.1.5 Long-term planning
1 .2 Fleet Logistics Support
1.2.1 Item Management






1 .2. 1 . 1 .4 Repair direction
1.2.1.1.5 Distribution Direction
1 .2. 1 . 1 .6 Disposal/Excess Direction
1.2.1.2 End Item Management















1.2.3.1 Develop maintenance concept
1.2.3.1.1 Source Selection (fabricate, purchase)





1.2.3.2.1 Modification Work Orders
1.2.3.3 Field Data
1.2.3.4 Technical Support
1.2.4 Facilities Planning and Management
1.2.5 Materiel Fielding
1.2.5.1 Total Package Fielding (to include Major Modifications)
1.2.5.1.1 Fielding Plan Coordination
1.2.5.1.2 New Materiel Introductory Briefing
1.2.5.1.3 Coordination Meetings
1 .2.5. 1 .4 New Equipment Training
1.2.5.1.5 Deprocessing of Equipment
1.2.6 Customer Support
1.2.7 Collect Performance Data












1.3.2.2 maintain and distribute technical data
1.3.2.3 provide electronic access to all technical data
1.3.2.4 develop and define performance specifications






1.3.6 Life Cycle Software Support
1.3.6.1 vehicle specific
1 .3.6. 1 .
1
diagnostic and test equipment
1.3.6.1.2 embedded software
1.3.6.2 Integrated Information Systems





1.4.4 End Item and Secondary Item Repair/Overhaul
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APPENDIX B. THE M109 FLEET MANAGEMENT RISK ASSESSMENT
SURVEY
The purpose of this survey is to quantify the risks involved in implementing the
Ml 09 Fleet Management Program. I have used the Concept of Operations Document
(CONOPS) (20 Feb 1997) as the preliminary Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) to help
identify the risks. The CONOPS Document describes all the functions performed by the
government for the Ml 09 FOV Fleet. The objective of the Ml 09 Pilot Program is to
reengineer the logistical support system by outsourcing those functions that make sense
and can be performed more efficiently. The scope of Fleet Management will undoubtedly
change as the program evolves; therefore, the CONOPS Document is used as a baseline
to describe the total scope of the program and the potential functions to be outsourced.
Various functional experts/managers have already identified the potential risk
events under each WBS element. Please use the scale below to assess each risk event in
terms of probability of occurrence (likelihood) and severity of impact (consequence) by
placing the Assessment/Rating number in the appropriate column. Severity of impact
will be evaluated for both cost and technical/performance. If the risk event does not
impact on cost or performance, place N/A in the appropriate column. If you feel you are
not qualified to assess the risks place N/Q in the appropriate column.
LIKELIHOOD:














Minimal or no impact -
Budget Estimates not
exceeded




exceeded and/or cost savings
still realized over existing
system
2 Acceptable with some reduction
to margin/baseline. Tech/Perf




Minimal or no cost savings
over existing system
3 Acceptable with significant
reduction to margin/baseline.





Actual cost actually exceeds
existing systems cost
4 Acceptable with no remaining


















1.1 - PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
1.1.1 - Contract Oversight
1 . Transition Planning - Ineffective planning and oversight of Fleet
Management.
2. Govt. Experience - No prior experience by the Govt, to manage
a Fleet Manager (FM) of this size and scope.
3. Performance Metrics and Incentives - Inability to establish
performance requirements and accurately measure and reward
FM performance.
4. Day to Day Exposure - Inability of the Govt, to maintain
oversight/exposure with the FM on a daily basis. Inability to
keep abreast of daily operations.
5. Ineffective Contract Structure/Requirements - Unplanned or
undesirable contract support due to faulty contract requirements.
6. Project Milestones - Missing planned milestones due to
inaccurate time estimates or inadequate performance.
7. Status Reporting - Failure to have a system to routinely report
financial, parts delivery, performance, etc. status to all
customers.
8. Non-Performance by the FM - Failure by the FM to provide
required products and services.
9. Complexity of Contract - Failure by the Govt, to properly
manage contract in a standardize manner due to complexity and
uniqueness.
10. Retention of Personnel - Inability to retain quality personnel in
both technical and management ends needed for proper
oversight. Loss of control and knowledge of the system.
1.1.2 - General Management
1 . Govt. Employee Resistance - Refusal by Govt, employees to
cooperate, implement, and work with FM. Inability to change
business culture.
2. Communications - Inability of the Govt, and FM to establish
effective lines of Communication.
3. Security - Inability of the FM to provide adequate security for
confidential equipment and data. Inability to provide secure
Commo via Internet.
4. Govt. Employee Union - Lack of cooperation and legal
challenges.
5. Personnel Management - Difficulties arising from Govt.






6. Legal Conflicts - Conflict with core policy, 60/40 rule, and $3
million competition rules.
7. Retreat Plan - Failure to have a executable plan to retreat out of
FM.
8. Retention of Personnel - Inability to retain quality personnel in
both technical and management ends needed for proper Govt,
management functions. Loss of control and knowledge of the
system.
9. Contingency Response - Inability ofFM management to remain
flexible in order to deal with contingency operations - e.g. surge
capability.
10. Bankruptcy - Weak financial strength will lead to bankruptcy.
1 1 . Transition Planning - Ineffective planning and execution of
Fleet Management.
1.1.3 - Requirements Determination
1 . Commercial Business Practices - Inability ofFM to fully use
commercial practices.
2. Parts Inventory Management - Unsatisfactory resolution of
issues or performance regarding parts ownership, requirements,
obsolescence, surpluses, stock levels, interoperability etc.
3. Scope of Parts Supply - Inappropriate decisions on what parts to
have the FM provide - (all, just Ml 09 unique, only mission
critical, etc.).
4. Customer Satisfaction - Inability by FM to determine customer
satisfaction on support.
5. Loss of Organic Capability - Loss by the Govt, to determine
appropriate requirements for support.
6. Complexity of Requirements - Inability of the FM to adequately
define, determine, understand military unique requirements.
Inability to address all requirements.
7. Changing Requirements - Inability of the FM to respond on a
daily basis to changing requirements. Can't be tied to
contractual limitation to respond.
8. Software Requirements - Inability by FM to determine software
requirements.
1.1.4 - Budget and Execution
1 . Funding - Delay or inability to allocate appropriate OMA and
PA fund lines to the FM after contract award.
2. Front End Funding - Pre Contract Activity - insufficient funding
to support program management activities prior to award that






3. Unrealization of Savings - Variance from planned budget and
projected savings.
4. Transition Planning - Ineffective planning and execution of fleet
management.
5. Pricing - Unstable or unfair prices for parts and services
provided by the FM.
6. Financial Pricing Methodology - Inability to establish an
efficient process for billing and paying.
7. Requisition Spending Controls - Difficulties relating to effective
fiscal controls when ordering directly from the vendor.
8. Disposition of Current Parts Inventory - Trauma involved with
the disposition or transition of current parts inventory to FM
ownership.
9. Status Reporting - failure to have a system to routinely report
financial
,
parts delivery, performance, asset visibility etc. status
to customers.
10. Data Availability - Inability of customers and legacy users to get
Ml 09 FOV life cycle support data necessary to perform their
mission.
1.1.5 - Long Term Planning
1 . Retreat Plan - Failure to have a executable plan to retreat out of
fleet management
2. FMS - Inability of the FM to support FMS customers long term.
3. Future Program Needs - Inability ofFM to project and respond
to future needs of program.
4. War Reserve - Failure of the FM to maintain adequate stock or
inability to deliver when needed.
5. Approval Level - Inability ofFM to obtain approval from Govt,
on changes to program. Inability to gain permission to use new
and innovative business practices.
6. Organic Capability - Loss of organic technical and
manufacturing capability by the Govt.
7. Repair Work/Field Maintenance - Inability of the FM to plan for
reliable repair work and field Maintenance.
8. Centralization - Trend by Govt, to require centralize operations
could stifle ideas and waste time.
9. Transition to Readiness Command - Premature Transition to
Readiness Command before concept of FM has matured and
experience/lessons learned have been gained.
10. Loss of Program Knowledge - Loss of knowledge and technical







1.2 - FLEET LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
1.2.1 - Item Management
1 . Transition Planning - Ineffective planning and execution of fleet
management.
2. Commercial Business Practices - Inability ofFM to use
commercial practices or to implement new business processes
without negatively affecting the functionality of current
STAMIS.
3. Status Reporting - Failure to have a system to routinely report
financial, parts delivery, accountability performance, status to
all customers.
4. Scope of Parts Supply - Inappropriate decision on what parts to
have the FM provide - ( all, Ml 09 Unique, mission critical only,
etc.)
5. Govt. Changes (e.g. Downsizing) - Inability to effectively
manage inventory due to constant changes. Ex. Inaccurate
forecasting and/or managing surpluses.
6. Incompatible FM Processes - FM's item management process
may be incompatible with existing system and may not input to
Govt, budgeting process.
7. Disposition of Current Inventory - Inability to efficiently
transfer ownership of parts to FM.
8. Pricing - Unstable or unfair prices for parts provided by FM
caused by not utilizing AMDF prices or by unexpected Govt.
Surcharges on parts.
9. DBOF Replenishment - Inability of the Govt, to replenish the
DBOF once inventory is transferred to the FM. Current
inventory is an investment in the DBOF.
10. Contingency Response - Inability to manage items effectively
during contingencies - e.g. Managing surge capability.
11. War Reserve - Inability ofFM to properly manage/maintain
adequate War Reserve.
12. Parts Inventory Management - Unsatisfactory resolution of
issues or performance regarding, requirements, obsolescence,
surpluses, stock levels, etc.
13. Acquisition Reform - Inability ofFM to achieve projected
savings/performance improvements due to Acquisition Reform
Initiatives already implemented.
14. Sources of Supply - Inability ofFM to establish/maintain







1.2.2 - Physical Distribution
1 . Deployed Operations - Inability to provide FM support to units
deployed. Inability of Commercial Agent to deliver.
2. Communication Capability - Inability to implement direct
communications between FM and customer. Inability ofFM to
Establish/maintain electronic interface with customers.
3. Status Reporting - Failure to have a system to report parts
delivery/status to customers.
4. Priority Setting - Failure of the FM to establish an equitable
system for allocation of parts.
5. Commercial Transport - Inability of FM to fully utilize
commercial only transport to reduce delivery times. Budgeting
may be insufficient to support commercial only transport.
6. Customs Delays - Inability ofFM to achieve delivery goals due
to Custom Delays (e.g. Korea).
7. Accountability Compatibility - Incompatible accountability
between FM and Govt, systems.
8. Total Asset Visibility - Failure ofFM to maintain TAV of
parts/equipment during transport.
9. Scope of Parts Supply - Inappropriate decision on what parts to
have the FM provide - ( all, Ml 09 Unique, mission critical only,
etc.)
1 0. Repair Parts Availability - inability of FM to provide an
adequate supply of spare parts.
1.2.3 Maintenance Management
1 . Technical Expertise - Inability of the FM to acquire and provide
the necessary expertise to maintain the system in the field.
2. Fleet Management Baseline Change - Changing requirements
could effect FM baseline for both services and personnel
requirements.
3. Organic Capability - Loss of organic maintenance capability by
the Govt.
4. Contractor on the Battlefield - Liability or lack of presence of
FM to provide support in times of war.
5. TM/Manual Maintenance/Distribution - Inability to FM to
prepare, maintain, print, and distribute TMs/Manuals.
1.2.4 - Facilities Planning Management
1 . FM Facilities - failure of the FM to have adequate facilities to
store and maintain inventory.
2. Environmental Concerns - Failure by the FM to adhere to all






3. Political Process - Future BRAC could change baseline and
eliminate available facilities.
1.2.5 - Material Fielding
1 . Training - Inability of FM or Govt, to provide necessary
customer training.
2. Doctrinal Changes - Inability of FM to adapt to Doctrinal
changes. Doctrinal Changes may affect baseline and upset
fielding plan.
3. Funds Availability - Inability ofFM to field equipment due to
funding constraints after contract award.
1.2.6 - Customer Support
1 . Deployed Operations - Inability to provide customer support for
deployed units.
2. Communications Capability - Inability to implement direct
communication between the customer and the FM.
3. Business Hardware/Software - Inability to provide equipment
needed to support a direct link to the FM.
4. Technical Support - Inadequate technical support by FM at the
customer level.
5. Cost Considerations - Potential for limited use ofFM support if
costs are charges "per encounter."
6. Training - inability of Govt, or Fm to provide necessary training
to customer.
7. Contractor on the Battlefield - liability or lack of presence of
FM to provide support in times of war.
8. Parallel Govt. Log Assistant Rep. - need for Govt, to provide
parallel Govt. Assistance to the customer.
1.2.7 - Collect Performance Data
1 . Data Collection - Failure on the FM to have a system in place
that can properly collect and analyze the data.
2. Existing Sample Data Collection (SDC) Methods - Incompatible
methods in SDC between FM and existing system.
3. Communications Capability - Inability to implement direct
communication between the customer and the FM. Inability of
FM to establish/provide electronic interface with customers.
4. Business Hardware/Software - Inability to provide equipment
needed to support a direct link to the FM.
5. Status Reporting - Failure to have a system to routinely report






1.3 - SYSTEM TECHNICAL SUPPORT
1.3.1 - Engineering
1. Technical/Functional Experts - Inability of the FM to obtain and
retain expertise in all technical disciplines - software/hardware,
explosives, cannon technology, hydraulics, automotive, commo,
fire control, etc.
2. Technical Data - Unsatisfactory resolution of availability,
format, ownership, assess for all tech data. Inability ofFM to
create/maintain technical data packages necessary for life cycle
support.
3. Program History/Lessons Learned - Loss of Program
History/Lessons Learned on the part of the Govt, and no or
limited past experience on the part of the FM.
4. Lack of Incentive by FM - No incentive for FM to design for
low life cycle costs when he is also paid for replacement parts.
5. Communications Interoperability - Failure by the FM to design
for communications interoperability with other systems on the
battlefield.
6. Safety - Failure by the FM to design for safety requirements.
7. Scope of Parts Supply - Inappropriate decision on what parts to
have the FM provide - ( all, Ml 09 Unique, mission critical only,
etc.)
1.3.2 - Configuration/Change Management
1 . Unnecessary Changes - FM could generate unnecessary
changes.
2. Interoperability - Failure of the FM to make correct
changes/mods that could adversely effect interoperability
between systems.
3 . TDP Changes - FM could make TDP changes to his advantage
that could limit/prevent future competition e.g. FM would
become life time sole source provider.
4. Configuration Management - Ineffective configuration control
or imposition of excessive oversight that prevents the FM from
using commercial CM practices.
5. Change Approval - Inability by the FM to obtain approval for
performance changes by the Govt, in an efficient and timely
manner.
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1.3.3 - Test & Evaluation
1 . Testing Expertise - Inability of FM to obtain appropriate
technical expertise in testing procedures that will consider all
essential factors -e.g. safety, interoperability, realism, human
interfaces, etc.
2. Testing Resources - Inability of the FM to use/acquire
appropriate facilities and resources to conduct testing - e.g.,
ammunition, access to Govt, test site/equipment.
3. Objectivity ofFM Conducting Testing - Inability ofFM to
conduct test in an objective manner if FM is designer, tester, and
approver.
1.3.4 - Product Improvements
1 . Product Improvement Opportunity Identification - Inability of
the FM to identify and exploit all opportunities that help avoid
costs and enhance performance.
2. Requirements Coordination - Inability of the FM to conform to
Army directives of exploiting commonality and expanding
interoperability.
3. Funding - Inability of the Govt, to properly fund P3I.
4. Testing P3I - Inability of the FM to properly test P3I.
5. P3I Approval - Inability ofFM to gain approval from Govt, on
P3I in a efficient and timely manner.
6. P3I Prioritization - Inability of FM to prioritize those items that
need P3I.
7. Modernization through Spares - Inability to implement business
practices that cause the FM to provide better performing and
more cost effective spare parts. Inability of Govt, to incentivize
low life cycle costs.
1.3.5 - Customer Support
1 . Deployed Operations - Inability to provide customer support for
deployed units.
2. Communications Capability - Inability to implement direct
communication between the customer and the FM. Inability of
FM to establish electronic interface with all customers and to
provide real time technical data to customers.
3. Business Hardware/Software - Inability to provide equipment
needed to support a direct link to the FM.
4. Technical Support - Inadequate technical support by FM at the
customer level. Inability to provide technical expertise and/or
needed equipment/parts to customer.
5. Cost Considerations - Potential for limited use ofFM support if
costs are charges "per encounter."
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6. Training - Inability of Govt, or Fm to provide necessary training
to customer.
7. Contractor on the Battlefield - Liability or lack of presence of
FM to provide support in times of war.
8. Customer Satisfaction - Inability ofFM to determine customer
satisfaction and to make appropriate changes is needed.
9. Undefined Costs/Requirements - Inability of Govt, and FM to
define all requirements and associated costs.
10. Electronic Training Aids - Inability ofFM to develop and utilize
electronic training aids based on the latest available technical
data.
1.3.6 - Life Cycle Software Support
1 . Software Facilities/Equipment - Inability ofFM to acquire and
use facilities and equipment needed for Software Support. Big
capital investment.
2. Software Expertise - Failure of the FM to acquire the
appropriate expertise in life cycle software support.
3. Requirements Coordination - Failure of the FM to coordinate
requirements with customer on different issues such as
interoperability, policies, mandates, digitization of battlefield
4. Software Support Transition - Failure to properly and
efficiently transfer responsibilities of software support from the
Govt, to the FM. Inappropriate time and scope of transition.
5. Software P3I - Inability ofFM to perform Software P3I.
6. Training - Inability of Govt, or FM to provide needed customer
training on software applications.
1.4 - MANUFACTURING/MAINTENANCE
1.4.1 Manufacturing
1 . Experience and Technical Expertise - Failure ofFM from
obtaining experienced personnel with the appropriate technical
expertise to effectively manufacture equipment.
2. Operations Startup - Failure ofFM to plan and recognize all
factors relating to startup operations - e.g. undefined costs and
requirements.
3. Technical Data - Inability of FM to obtain correct and
appropriate technical data from Govt, necessary for
manufacturing operations.
4. Labor Force/Management Disputes - Failure ofFM to resolve
all labor disputes that could effect operations - e.g. Labor
union/employee strike.
5. Raw material/Parts Availability - Inability of FM to
obtain/acquire necessary raw material/parts needed for
manufacture operations.
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6. Commercial Business Practices - Inability ofFM to fully use
commercial business practices - e.g. inability to achieve an
efficient economic production rate.
7. Facilities/Equipment - Inability of FM to acquire needed
facilities and/or equipment or to use Govt, equipment and/or
facilities.
1.4.2 Maintenance
1 . Experience and Technical Expertise - Failure ofFM from
obtaining experienced personnel with the appropriate technical
expertise to effectively maintain equipment.
2. Raw material/Parts Availability - Inability ofFM to
obtain/acquire necessary raw material/parts needed for
manufacture operations.
3. Commercial Business Practices - Inability ofFM to fully use
commercial business practices - e.g. inability to achieve an
efficient economic production rate.
4. Organic Capability - Loss of higher echelon maintenance
expertise by the Govt.
5. Contractor on the Battlefield - liability or lack of presence of
FM to provide maintenance support in times of war.
6. TM/Manual Support - Inability ofFM to provide timely and
accurate manuals.
7. Facilities/Equipment - Inability ofFM to acquire needed
facilities and/or equipment or to use Govt, equipment and/or
facilities to perform maintenance operations.
8. Deployed Operations - Inability ofFM to provide maintenance
support when deployed.
9. Communications Capability - Inability to implement direct
communication between the customer and the FM. Inability of
FM to establish/provide electronic interface with customers.
10. Automated Maintenance Tools - Inability ofFM to develop,
distribute, utilize automated maintenance tools that will
aid/facilitate difficult maintenance and operational problems.
1 1 . Field Maintenance - Disruption of maintenance operations due
to imposing the FM in the process.
1.4.3 - Modifications and Conversions
1 . Experience and Technical Expertise - Failure ofFM from
obtaining experienced personnel with the appropriate technical
expertise to effectively modify/change equipment.
2. Parts Availability - Inability ofFM to obtain/acquire necessary
parts needed for modification/conversions
3. Technical Data - Inability ofFM to obtain correct and
appropriate technical data from Govt, necessary for
modifications/conversions.
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4. Facilities/Equipment - Inability ofFM to acquire needed
facilities and/or equipment or to use Govt, equipment and/or
facilities to perform modifications/conversions.
5. Commercial Business Practices - Inability ofFM to fully use
commercial business practices - e.g. inability to achieve an
efficient economic modification/conversion rate.
6. Contractor on the Battlefield - Liability or lack of presence of
FM to provide conversions/modifications in times of war.
1.4.4 - End Item & Secondary Item Repair/Overhaul
1 . Experience and Technical Expertise - Failure ofFM from
obtaining experienced personnel with the appropriate technical
expertise to effectively repair/overhaul items.
Parts Availability - Inability ofFM to obtain/acquire necessary
parts needed for repair/overhaul.
3. Technical Data - Inability ofFM to obtain correct and
appropriate technical data from Govt, necessary for
repair/overhaul.
Facilities/Equipment - Inability ofFM to acquire needed
facilities and/or equipment or to use Govt, equipment and/or
facilities to perform repair/overhaul.
5. Commercial Business Practices - Inability ofFM to fully use
commercial business practices - e.g. inability to achieve an
efficient economic repair/overhaul rate.
Contractor on the Battlefield - Liability or lack of presence of
FM to provide conversions/modifications in times of war.
7. Organic Capability - Loss of program history/lessons learned by
the Govt, in performing repair/overhaul.
8. Field Maintenance - Disruption of maintenance operations due
to imposing the FM in the process.
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ADDITIONAL COMMENTS
Use the space below to comment on any of the risks identified.
If you do not understand a particular risk event please reference using the WBS#.
3. If there are risk events that you feel should be included in this survey please write
the risk event in the space below. Use the scale to assess the risk and cross-reference the
risk event to the appropriate WBS#.
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APPENDIX C: M109 FLEET MANAGEMENT RISK EVENT WATCHLISTS
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT RISK EVENT WATCHLIST
Ranking Risk Event CONOPS # RES
1 Funding 1.1.4 24.5
2 Govt Experience 1.1.1 19.5
3 Retention of Personnel 1.1.1 18.89
4 Pricing 1.1.4 18
5 Project Milestones 1.1.1 17.22
6 Govt Employee Resistance 1.1.2 17
7 Non Performance by FM 1.1.1 16.97
8 Unrealization of Savings 1.1.4 16.91
9 Organic capability 1.1.5 16.91
10 Transition Planning - Cont O/S 1.1.1 16.667
11 Retention of Personnel - G/M 1.1.2 16.52
12 Ineffect Contract Structure 1.1.1 16.44
13 Govt Employee Union 1.1.2 16.33
14 Parts Inventory Ownership 1.1.3 16.05
15 Dispossession of Curr Parts Invt 1.1.4 16.05
16 Perf Metrics and Incentives 1.1.1 16
17 Legal Conflicts 1.1.2 16
18 Loss of Program Knowledge 1.1.5 16
19 Complexity of Contract 1.1.1 15.5
20 Retreat plan 1.1.2 15.1667
21 Contingency Response 1.1.2 15
22 Transition Planning 1.1.2 15
23 Retreat Plan 1.1.5 15
24 Front end Funding 1,1,4 14.77
25 Future Program Needs 1.1.5 14.58
26 Repair Wk/FId Maint. 1.1.5 14
27 Transition Planning 1.1.4 13.77
28 Scope of Parts Supply 1.1.3 13.75
29 Personnel Management 1.1.2 13.22
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PROGRAM MANAGEMENT RISK EVENT WATCHLIST CONTINUED
Ranking Risk Event CONOPS # RES
30 Transition to Readiness Cmd 1.1.5 13.22
31 Software Requirements 1 1.3 12.91
32 Approval Level 1 1.5 12.91
33 Changing Requirements 1 1.3 12.88
34 Commercial Buss. Practices 1 1.3 12.5
35 War Reserve 1 1.5 12.33
36 Day to Day Exposure 1 1.1 12.27
37 Communications 1 1.2 12.05
38 Complexity of Requirements 1 1.3 12.05
39 FMS 1 1.5 1 1 .667
40 Bankruptcy 1 1.2 11.3
41 Loss of Organic Capability 1 1.3 10.88
42 Customer Satisfaction 1 1.3 10.83
43 Centralization 1 1.5 10.83
44 Data Availability 1 1.4 10.5
45 Requisition Spending Controls 1 1.4 10.47
46 Status Reporting 1 1.4 10.11
47 Status Reporting 1 1.1 9.72
48 Security 1 1.2 8.55
49 Financial Pricing Methodology 1 1.4 7
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B. FLEET LOGISTICAL SUPPORT RISK EVENT WATCHLIST
Ranking Risk Event CONOPS # RES
1 Fleet Mangt Baseline Change 1.2.3 20.81
2 Contractor on the Battlefield 1.2.3 20.16
3 Transition Planning 1.2.1 19
4 Parts Inventory Mangt 1.2.1 18.37
5 Scope of Parts Supply 1.2.1 18.22
6 Contractor on the Battlefield 1.2.6 18.22
7 Govt Changes - Downsizing 1.2.1 17.57
8 Deployed Operations 1.2.2 16.65
9 Repair Parts Availability 1.2.2 16.65
10 Disposition of Curr Inventory 1.2.1 16.53
11 Contingency Response 1.2.1 16.53
12 Communications Capability 1.2.2 15.96
13 Comm Business Practice 1.2.1 15.92
14 Customs Delays 1.2.2 15.8
15 Deployed Operations 1.2.6 15.61
16 Funds Availability 1.2.5 15.35
17 DBOF Replenishment 1.2.1 14.69
18 War Reserve 1.2.1 14.69
19 Scope of Supply Parts 1.2.2 14.29
20 Communications Capability 1.2.6 14.04
21 FM Facilities 1.2.4 13.71
22 Cost Considerations 1.2.6 13.53
23 Organic Capability 1.2.3 13.47
24 Incompatible FM processes 1.2.1 13.18
25 Communications Capability 1.2.7 13.16
26 Pricing 1.2.1 13.14
27 Commercial Transport 1.2.2 13.14
28 Doctrinal Changes 1.2.5 13.06
29 Business Hardware/Software 1.2.6 12.85
30 Business Hardware/Software 1.2.7 12.57
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B. FLEET LOGISTICAL SUPPORT RISK EVENT WATCHLIST
CONTINUED
Ranking Risk Event CONOPS # RES
31 Acquisition Reform 1.2.1 12.29
32 Environmental Concerns 1.2.4 12.2
33 Political Process 1.2.4 12.08
34 Accountability Compatibility 1.2.2 11.76
35 Parallel Govt. Log Representative 1.2.6 11.51
36 Technical Expertise 1.2.3 11.14
37 Training 1.2.6 11.14
38 Status Reporting 1.2.1 11.02
39 Status Reporting 1.2.7 10.86
40 TM/Manual Maint/Distribution 1.2.3 10.04
41 Technical Support 1.2.6 10.04
42 Priority Setting 1.2.2 9.82
43 Training 1.2.5 9.8
44 Existing Sample Data Coll. Methods 1.2.7 9.8
45 Data Collection 1.2.7 9.55
46 Sources of Supply 1.2.1 8.37
47 Status Reporting 1.2.2 7.96
48 Total Asset Visibility 1.2.2 7.96
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SYSTEM TECHNICAL SUPPORT RISK EVENT WATCHLIST
Ranking Risk Event CONOPS # RES
1 Lack of Incentive by FM 1.3.5 22.78
2 Contractor on the Battlefield 1.3.5 21.85
3 Funding 1.3.4 19.41
4 Prog History/Lessons Learned 1.3.1 19.4
5 Objectivity of FM Conducting Test 1.3.3 19.05
6 Technical/Funct Experts 1.3.1 18.78
7 Unnecessary Changes 1.3.2 18.36
8 Modernization Thru Spares 1.3.4 18
9 Interoperability 1.3.2 17.88
10 TDP Changes 1.3.2 17.62
11 Communications Capability 1.3.5 16.73
12 Commo Interoperability 1.3.1 16.56
13 Requirements Coordination 1.3.4 16.53
14 P3I Approval 1.3.4 16.5
15 Business Hardware/Software 1.3.5 16.32
16 Prod Improvement Opportunity ID 1.3.4 16.16
17 Configuration Management 1.3.2 15.75
18 P3I Prioritization 1.3.4 15.45
19 Testing Expertise 1.3.3 15.31
20 Deployed Operations 1.3.5 14.92
21 Testing Resources 1.3.3 14.69
22 Undefined Cost Requirements 1.3.5 14.45
23 Safety 1.3.1 14.34
24 Testing P3I 1.3.4 14.09
25 Change Approval 1.3.2 13.75
26 Technical Data 1.3.1 13.39
27 Scope of Spare Parts 1.3.1 12.65
28 Cost Considerations 1.3.5 12.08
29 Technical Support 1.3.5 11.42
30 Customer Satisfaction 1.3.5 11.15
31 Training 1.3.5 10.85
32 Electronic Training Aides 1.3.5 10.41
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MANUFACTURING/MAINTENANCE RISK EVENT WATCHLIST
Ranking Risk Event CONOPS # RES
1 Contractor on the Battlefield 1.4.2 19.6
2 Contractor on the Battlefield 1.4.4 18.42
3 Organic Capability 1.4.3 17.87
4 Contractor on the Battlefield 1.4.3 17.77
5 Organic Capability 1.4.1 16.63
6 Deployed Operations 1.4.2 16.44
7 Commercial Bus Practices 1.4.1 15.86
8 Automated Maintenance Tools 1.4.2 14.58
9 Technical Data 1.4.3 14.57
10 Labor/Mgt. Disputes 1.4.1 14.04
11 Technical Data 1.4.1 13.59
12 Technical Data 1.4.4 13.59
13 Organic Capability 1.4.2 13.47
14 Organic Capability 1.4.4 13.28
15 Commercial Buss Practices 1.4.4 13.22
16 Commercial Buss Practice 1.4.3 12.85
17 Experience and Tech. Expertise 1.4.3 12.24
18 Commercial Buss Practices 1.4.2 11.79
19 Operational Start-up 1.4.1 11.75
20 Experience and Tech. Expertise 1.4.4 11.42
21 Communications Capability 1.4.2 10.88
22 Facilities/Equipment 1.4.1 10.41
23 Facilities/Equipment 1.4.4 10.41
24 Field Maintenance 1.4.2 10.33
25 Experience and Tech. Expertise 1.4.2 9.8
26 Field Maintenance 1.4.4 9.66
27 Experience and Tech. Expertise 1.4.1 9.55
28 Facilities/Equipment 1.4.2 9.43
29 Facilities/Equipment 1.4.3 9.42
30 TM/Manual Support 1.4.2 8.86
31 Raw Material/Parts Availability 1.4.1 8.33
32 Parts Availability 1.4.3 7.84
33 Parts Availability 1.4.4 7.83
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